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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
SMALL v. SMALL.
In Pennsylvania, a wife may not sue her husband, directly and in her own name,
for money received by him from her separate estate.
The Married Persons' Property Act of 1887, gives to a wife, in her own name,
those rights of action only, which are necessarily incident to her rights of ownership
of property and capacity to contract as if she were afeme sole.
Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County.
Assumpsit by Lavinia Small against David W. Small, her
husband, in which action judgment was rendered against the
husband, and he appealed.
The power of the wife to bring such a suit in her own name,
depended upon-
An Act relating to husband and wife, defining the rights to and power over their
property, to make conveyances and contracts, authorizing them to sue, and be sued,
upon their contracts, and for torts, and defining the interest of husband and wife in.
the estate of each, by will or otherwise.
SEcrioN i. Be it enacted, etc., That hereafter, marriage shall not be held to im-
pose any disability on, or incapacity in, a married woman, as to the acquisition,.
ownership, possession, control, use, or disposition of property of any kind, in any
trade or business in which she may engage, or for necessaries, and for the use,
enjoyment, and.improvement of her separate estate, real and personal, or her right
and power to make contracts of any kind, and to give obligations binding herself'
therefor; but every married woman shall have the same right to acquire, hold,
possess, improve, control, use, or dispose of her property, real and personal, in.
possession or expectancy, in the same mainer as if she were a feme sole, without
the intervention of any trustee, and with all the rights and liabilities incident thereto,
except as herein provided, as if she were not married; and property of every kind,
owned, acquired, or earned by a woman, before or during her marriage, shall be-
long to her, and not to her husband, or his creditors: Provided, however, That
a married woman shall have no power to mortgage, or convey her real estate, un-
less her husband join in such mortgage, or conveyance.
SFCroN 2. A married woman shall be capable of entering into, and rendering
herself liable upon any contract, relating to any trade, or business, in which she
may engage, or for nece saries, and for the use, enjoyment, and improvement of her
separate estate, and for suing and being sued, either upon such contracts, or for
torts done to or committed by her, in all respects as if she were a feme sole, and
her husband need not be joined with her, as plaintiff, or defendant, or be made a
party to any action, suit, or legal proceeding of any kind, brought by, or against,
her, in her individual right, and any debt, damages, or costs, recovered by her in
any such action, suit, or proceeding, shall be her separate property, and any debt,.
damages, or costs, recovered against her in any such action, suit, or other proceed-
ing, shall be payable out of her separate property, and not otherwise: Provided,,
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owmever, That nothing in this, or the preceding section, shall enable a marriec
woman to become accommodation endorser, guarantor, or surety, for another.
SECTION 3. A married woman may make, execute, and deliver leases of her
property, real and personal, and assignments, transfers, and sales of her separate
personal property, and notes, bills, drafts, bonds, or obligations of any kind, and
appoint attorneys to act for her, and it shall not be necessary for her husband to be
made a party thereto, or joined therein.
SECTION 4. Husband and wife shall have the same civil remedies upon contracts
in their own name and right, against all persons for the protection and recovery of
their separate property, as unmarried persons.
SECTION 5. A married woman may dispose of her property, real and personal,
by last will and testament, in writing, signed by her, or manifested by her mark or
cross, made by her at the end thereof, in the same manner as if she were
unmarried.
SECTION 6. This Act shall be known as "The Married Persons' Property Act."
SECTION 7. All acts inconsistent herewith, are hereby repealed. [Approved,
June 3, 1887: P. L. 332.]
F. H. Kiinmncl and W. R. Gillan, for David V. Small.
Alexander Stewart and 0. C. Bowers, for Lavinia Small.
MITCHELL, J., October 7, i889. The single question pre-
sented is whether the Act of June 3, 1887 (P. L. 332), known
as the " Married Persons' Property Act," authorizes a wife to
sue her husband, directly, and in her own name, for money
received by him from her separate estate.
Section four of the Act reads: [vide supra.] This language
is general and unlimited. It makes no exception of an action
against each other, and, taken. by itself, its natural meaning is,
perhaps, broad enough to include them without straining. But
no rule of judicial interpretation is wiser or better settled than
that which prohibits the taking of a single sentence, even
though it forms a separate section of a statute, and construing
it apart from the context, or without regard to the subject
matter, and the general purpose sought to be accomplished.
The present Act gives notable warning of the danger of such
a course. Though not long, it is extremely intricate, and con-
fused, if not contradictory. The first two sections make the
same general grant at least four times, and each time with
such variations that, though the general purpose is clear, very
difficult questions may be raised as to the exact limits of the
powers conferred.
Section three then proceeds to grant certain specific powers,
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all of which, except for the doubt raised by this section its-
self, are clearly conferred by parts of the language of the pre-
ceding sections. It is a striking example of what is .not in-
frequent in legislation, and the a- oidance of which, I may say
in passing, is by no means the least difficult of judicial ac-
complishments, the desire to enforce and emphasize the inten-
tion, leading to a second expression, which tends to becloud
the first. Next is the fourth section, with which we are im-
mediately concerned. Like the preceding section, it seems to
' be the product of a desire to emphasize a grant already abund-
.antly implied in the control over property, "with all. the
-rights and liabilities incident thereto," of the first section, and
,expressly given in the capacity to sue and be sued, provided
by the second. Can it be fairly construed to mean more than
this ?
The general purpose of the Act is clear enough. It is to
give married women the same freedom of ownership, control,
and disposition of their property and earnings, and the rights
and remedies incident thereto, that men have over theirs. It
accordihgly confers upon them the absolute power of disposi-
tion of their personal property, but requires the joining of the
*husband in mortgage or conveyance of real estate. The rights
,of action, conferred by implication, in section one, as already
said, or expressly, in the latter sections, are given as means of
-maintaining the rights of property conferred by the sections
themselves, and there is nowhere any indication of a purpose
-to extend them beyond their character, as a necessary inci-
dent for that purpose. Still less is there any indication of a
purpose to extend the rights or powers of the husband, which
a right to sue the wife, under the construction of section four
contended for, would certainly do.
If we look not only at the general intent of the Act, but
-more closely at the language used, we are led to the same re-
sult. The purpose is not only expressed broadly, in apt
language, once, but is repeated and reiterated with superabund-
ant caution. In this varied and detailed consideration, it is
impossible to suppose that so important a branch of the sub-
ject, as the right of action between husband and wife should
not have been thought of, or being thought of, should not
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have been granted in unequivocal terms, if intended to be
granted at all. To legislators versed in the principles of the
common law, it would immediately suggest itself as a distinct
and momentous departure from the legal policy of centuries,
which ordinary phraseology, however general, would not com-
monly be understood to intend, and it is inconceivable that,
under such circumstances, it should be granted obscurely and
by implication. As said by WOODWARD, J., in Ritter v. Ritter
(1858), 31 Pa. 398-
'€ If the Legislature meant that such actions as the present should be sustained,
they had command of a very copious language in which to express their will."
The Acts of April II, 1856 (P. L. 315), and June ii, 1879
(P. L. 126), make provisions for actions by the wife against
the husband in case of desertion, or neglect, or refusal to sup-
port, and we conclude that the Legislature thoughf this
remedy ample, without extending it to suits between parties
living amicably together in the marital relation.
This view is confirmed almost to a demonstration by the
legislative history of the Act of 1887. The fourth section
follows closely the English Married Women's Property Act of
1882 (45 and 46 Vict., c 75; Law Rep. Stat. 1882, p. 458),
and, as originally introduced into the Senate, it provided, as
that Act does, that-
"Husband and wife shall have the same civil remedies upon contracts in their
own name and right against all persons, including each other," etc. (Legislative
Record, 1887, p. 896)
This specific provision, which put the change in the previous
law into that precise, definite, and unquestionable form which
its importance demanded, was struck out, and the section
passed without it. The inference from this action is irresisti-
ble, that the Legislature did not intend that actions between
husband and wife, while living together, should be authorized.
It is argued that as the language is the same with respect to
both husband and wife, it must authorize both or neither to
sue the other; and, therefore, if it does not authorize the hus-
band to sue the wife, we shall have the absurd result that the
Legislature has solemnly conferred upon a married man the
same right to sue strangers that an unmarried man possesses.
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This is not without plausibility, and, if the section stood alone,
would be of much force; but taken in its connection, it is an
additional link in the argument that the husband's rights, ex-
cept as involved in the regulation of his wife's, were not in-
tended to be affected at all. The same may be said of the
phrase "their separate property" in the same section. What
is a husband's separate property? In language of the law,
such a phrase is as absurd as the result pictured in the
argument referred to. In truth the real explanation of both
phrases, entirely unsuitable as they stand, is the failure to
notice the effect of striking out the words "including each
other," contained in the Act as originally introduced. With
these words left in, the absurdity, as to suits by the husband,
disappears, and the phrase "separate property," though not
elegant as to legal style, is clear and definite in its meaning.
There are several other changes, from the first draft, to the
Act, as finally passed,-such as the striking out of section
three, of the power to convey real estate without the husband
joining, and the attaching of a proviso to the contrary to sec-
tion one, etc.,--which indicate that the Act, as originally in-
troduced, was much more radical in its changes that the Leg-
islature was willing to pass; and we think it clear that the
authority to sue each other, was one of the proposed changes
which were refused a sanction.
One further consideration which may be adverted to, is the
hardship and injustice which might arise as to past matters,
by the grant of a universal and unrestricted right to sue upon
a claim which the defendant may have had no reason to ex-
pect or foresee. The present case affords a striking example
of these dangers. Of course, I do not speak of 'the moral
merits of the case, for of these I know nothing, but of the
legal possibilities. The husband received this money about
i856. There is no claim that he received it against the wife's
will, nor any evidence that it was not used for their mutual
benefit in the support of the family. Thirty years after it had
been thus spent, presumably with her entire approval, a differ-,
ence or quarrel occurs, and the wife sues to recover the
money. No promise to pay is proved or pretended. The
plaintiff rests on the presumption that her husband received
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it as trustee for her, and, as her counsel truly say, "the burden
is upon him to prove the contrary." Yet the very same Leg-
islature that is claimed to have put this action and its conse-
quent burden upon him, in a most ably drafted and elaborately
considered statute on the competency of witnesses, expressly
denied him the right of testifying that the money was given
to him by her, or that he spent it at her direction. This of
course, is a legislative rather than a judicial argument, but it
adds force to the considerations which induce the Court to say
now, as it has said with marked emphasis heretofore, that so
great a change in the policy of the law upon a subject that
may come home to every household in the Commonwealth,
should not rest on inference, or implication from general
words, but should appear by the explicit and unquestionable
mandate of the Legislature; and when the change is made, if
at all, it should be done in such form as to guard against the
possibilities of injustice in regard to past transactions, such as
are suggested in the present case.
Judgment reversed.
By the Married Women's Property
Act of 1882 (45 and 46 Vic., C. 75),
every "contract entered into by a mar-
ried woman shall be deemed to be a
contract entered into by her with respect
to, and to bind, her separate property,
unless the contrary be shown."
By Section twelve, it is enacted, that
"Every woman shall have, in her own
name, against all persons whomsoever,
including her husband, the same civil
remedies for the protection and security
of her own separate property, as if such
property belonged to her as afeme sole."
In Butler v. Butler (1885), L. R. 14
Q. B. D. 831, an action was brought by
a husband against his wife, to recover
,C1,848 out of her separate estate, for
money paid in her behalf.
WILIS, J. "Now, I take it to be
clear that with respect to the wife's
separate estate, free from restraint upon
anticipation, she is competent to con-
tract, and to contract with her own hus-
band. It is a remarkable instance of
legislation by judicial decisioA, whereby
the old common law has been entirely
abrogated and the power of the wife to
contract with her husband, has been
established, and upon a contract of loan,
the wife may sue the husband."
Therefore this case rules that a hus-
band may maintain his action against
his wife, and may charge her separate
property for money lent by him to her
after marriage, and for money paid by
him for her aftermarriage at herrequest;
but he is not entitled, since the above
Act, to maintain an action against her
for money lent to her, or money paid to
her, at her request, before marriage.
This ruling was sustained on appeal
(1885), L. R1 16 Q. B. D. 374, in
learned opinions by the Master of the
Rolls (Lord ESHER), and Mr. Justice
CoTroN.
In Coun/z v. AIlarkliug (1875), 30
Ark. 17, a judgment confessed by a
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husband in favor of his wife was held
to be void and was quashed on cer'o-
rari.
(The Civil Code of Arkansas (Q 42
and Act April 28, x873, 4, 8, 9; Dig.
1884, p. 975) provides, that, "Where a
married woman is a party, her husband
must be joined with her, except in the
following cases: "First. She may be
sued alone, upon contracts made by her,
in respect to her sole and separate prop-
erty, or in respect of any trade, or busi;
ness, carried on by her, under any
statute of this State. Second. She may
maintain an action in her own name,
for, or on account of, her sole or sepa-
rate estate, or property, or for damages
against any person, or body corporate,
for any injury to her person, character,
or property. Third. Where the action
is between herself and her husband, she
may sue, and be sued, alone."
[In Alabama, under Statute Feb. 28,
x887, 1 7 (Code, p. 526, 1 2347), "The
wife must sue alone, at law or in equity,
upon all contracts made by or with her,
or for the recovery of her separate prop-
erty, or for injuries to such property, or
for its rents, income, or profits, or for all
injuriestoherperson or reputation; and
upon all contracts made by her, or en-
gagements into which she enters, and
for all torts committed by her, she must
be sued as if she were sole."
[InArizona,byRev.Stat. x8 8 7,p. 169,
683, "When a married woman is a
party, her husband shall be joined with
her, except that-i. Where the action
concerns her separate property, she may
sue, or be sued, alone. 2. When the
action is between herself and her hus-
band, she may sue, or be sued, alone."
And by the same-Rev. Stat. 1887, p.
373, 2104 (Act Feb. 28, 1887)," Here-
after, married women of the age of
twenty-one years and upwards shall
have the same legal rights as men of
the age of twenty-one years and upwards,
except the right of suffrage and of hold-
ing officd, and except the right to make
contracts binding the common property
of the husband and wife; and shal be
subject to the same legal liabilities as
men of the age of twenty-one years and
upwards, but no part of this section shall
be so construed as to prevent women
from voting at school elections, or hold
office as school trustees, as now provide&
by law."
[In California, the provisions of the
Civil Code are to the same effect as those
of Arizona (Code of Civil Procedure,
1885, p. 1o, 370)-" When a married
woman is a party, her husband must be
joined with her, except: I. When the
action concerns her separate property,
or her right or claim to the homestead
property, she may sue alone. 2. When
the action is between herself and her
husband, she may sue and be sued
alone. 3- When she is living separate
and apart from her husband, by reason
of his desertion of her, or by agreement
in writing, entered into between them,
she may sue and be sued alone."
[Wilson v. Wi~son (1868), 36 Cal.
447, was an action by a married woman
against her husband, for the recovery of
two promissory notes executed before
their marriage. The right of action was
sustained under the section cited above,
SAWYER, C. J. (now U. S. Circuit Judge),
saying: "There is no limitation as to
the kind of actions that may be main-
tained Ibetween herself and her hus-
band;' and section 395, as amended in
x865-6 [ 1881 of the Civil Code, p.
621], authorizes the husband and wife
to testify on their own behalf, or on be-
half of each other, as witnesses in actions
between themselves, excep in actons of
divorce. This provision contemplates
that there may be actions between bus-
band and wife, other than those relating
to divorces. What are they, unless re-
lating to rights of property? Disputes
with respect to property may arise be-
tween them when the separate existence
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of the wife, and a separate right of prop-
erty is recognized at law, as in this
State, as well as other matters; and
when they do arise, there is as great
necessity for a judicial determination of
the questions, as when they arise be-
tween other parties. A litigation of the
kind between husband and wife may be
unseemly and abhorrent to our ideas of
propriety, but a litigation in one form
can be no more so than in another, and
no more so than- the necessity itself
which gives rise to the litigation. The
present policy of the law is to recognize
the separate legal and civil existence of
the wife, and separate rights of property,
and the very recognition by the law of
suchseparate existence, andrights at law,
as well as in equity, to hold and enjoy
separate property, involves a necessity
for opening the doors of the judicial
tribunals to her, in order that the rights
guaranteed to her may be protected and
enforced. The right to bring actions is
accordingly recognized in the sections
referred to, and no limitation is imposed
as to the character of the actions :" pp.
446-7.
[Conversely, the husband successfully
required his wife to reconvey his real
estate, which he had conveyed to her
in lieu of making a devise, on her
promise to reconvey at his request:
Brison v. Brison (1888), 75 Cal. 525.
[Another point in Wilson v. Wilson,
was equally interesting. The ordinary
period of limitation had expired before
the wife began her action. The Statute
of Limitations of I85o, as amended in
x863 (Code Civ. Procedure p. 102,
352), provides, that: "If a person en-
titled to bring an action mentioned in
Chapter III, of this title [i. e., other
than for the recovery of real property,
though the provision in regard to
realty is to the same effect: Id. p. 94
328], be, at the time the cause of
action accrued, either: 4. A married
woman, and her husband be a ne:essaiy
party with her in commencing suck
action; The time of such disability is
not a part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action." The
words in italics were added by the
amendatory act, and 1 370 (supra}
being permissive in allowing the wife to
sue alone, (Corcoran v. Doll (1867),
32 Cal. 83, go), the running of the
statute would have been suspended but
for the words added in 1863: Wilson
v. WZilson (1868), 36 Cal. 447, 45r.
[In Colorado, by the Civil Code of'
1887 (chap. i, 6)-"A married woman
may sue, and be sued in all matters, the
same as if she were sole." The Gen..
Stat. 1883 (p. 695, 2268), had re-
stricted the power to cases, "in all mat-
ters having relation to her property,
person, or reputation," but 2279 was
identical with the provisions of the Civil
Code, sup ra. Section 2271 of the Gen.
Stat. 1883 also provided-"Any married
woman may carry on any trade or busi-
ness, and perform any labor or services,
on her sole and separate account, and
the earnings of any married woman,
from her trade, business, labor, or serv-
ices, shall be her sole and separate
property, and maybe used and invested
by her in her own name; and she may
sue anild be sued, as if sole, in regard to
her trade, business, labor, services, and
earnings, and her property acquired by
trade, business, services, and the pro--
ceeds thereof, may be taken on any ex-
ecution against her."
[Colorado Limitation Act also pro-
vides (Gen. Stat., p. 673, 2177)-"If"
any person, entitled to bring any of the
actions before mentioned in this Act
[i.e., personal actions, and bills founded
upon fraud or trust], shall, at the time-
when the cause of action accrues, be-
within the age of twenty-one years, or-
a married woman, insane, imprisoned,.
or absent from the United States, suck
person may bring the said actions within
the time in this chapter respective'v-
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3imited after the disability shall be re-
anoved !"
In Connecticut, Gen. StaL z888 (p.
234) provide--" 986. When a married
woman shall carry on any business, and
-any right of action shall accrue to her
therefrom, she may sue upon the same,
as if she were unmarried." In Rock-
wdl v. Clark (x877), 44 Conn. 534, this
tword "may" was particularly observed,
and the husband was not allowed to
-sue, as "trustee," upon his wife's trade
,contracts. "It confers a right to sue,
which did not exist before; not in addi-
ion to the right of the [husband, under
. 2792, as] trustee, but in exclusion of
it; and that it is a statute for simplificao
,tion:" PARDEE, J., Id. 536.
In Adams v. Adams (1883), 51 Conn.
'135, suit was brought to set aside con-
-veyances of real estate by a woman who
had- been abandoned by her husband.
-The Gen. Stat. (1888, 2794) pro-
-vided that "When any man shall have
.abandoned his wife, he shall be deemed
-to have abandoned his right to the cus-
tody and control of her property and the
-rents and income thereof; and said
property shall thereupon immediately
Piest in.her and be her sole estate, and
4he may, during the continuance of such
:abandonment, sue and be sued, and
transact business in her own name, as a
fene sole." The Court held she could
bring such a suit, under the statute,
;against her husband.
[SW's Appeal (1888), 56 Conn. 184,
:rose aftier the passage of the Act of
a877 (Gen. Stat. x888, p. 61o), which
;rovides--" 2796. In case of mar-
triages on or after April 20, 1877,neither
bushand nor wife shall acquire, by force
-of the marriage, any right to or interest
in any property held by the other before,
-or acquired after, such marriage, except
s a to the share of the survivor in the
Iroperty, as provided by law. The
-separate earnings of the wife shall be
her sole property. She shall have power
to make contracts with third persons,
and to convey to them her real and
personal estate, as if unmarried. Her
property shall be liable to be taken for
her debts, except when exempt from
execution, but in no case shall be liable
to be taken for the debts of her husband.
And the husband shall not be liable for
her debts contracted before marriage,
nor upon her contracts made after mar-
riage, except as provided in the suc-
ceeding section." The marriage oc-
curred in January, z878, and the wife
loaned large sums to her husband, upon
his promise to repay with interest.
The husband afiterward failed and
made an assignment in insolvency-and
the wife was both allowed to claim a
dividend and to establish her claim by
her own oath. The statute was ad-
mittedly silent, "b u t no intention to
impair her prior right to enter into such
contracts, is implied by such silence.
The statute was not designed to abridge
any rights of property which the wife
had before its enactment, but, on the
contrary, its object was to invest her
with the complete ownership and con-
trol of the property which she had
when married, or migkt thereafter ac-
quire." 3EARDSLEY, J., p. 186.
[The Gen. Stat..Conn. (p. 611), also
provide-" 2798. In case of marri-
ages existing prior to April 20, x877,
the provisions of the two preceding
sections shall apply, whenever any hus-
band and wife have entered, or shall
hereafter enter, during marriage, into a
written contract with each other for the
mutual abandonment of all rights of
either in the property of the other, un-
der prior statutes, or at common law
and for the acceptance instead thereof
of the rights in said sections provided,
which contract shall be recorded in the
Court of Probate of the district, and in
the town clerk's office of the town in
which they reside. And thereupon,said
provisions shall apply to such marriage."
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[In Dakota, under Gen. Stat. z887,
c. 98, Sec. x (Compiled L. x887, p. 554)
-" 260o. From and after the passage
of this Act, woman shall retain the same
]egal existence and legal personality
after marriage as before marriage, and
shall receive the same protection of her
-rights as a woman, which her husband
does as a man; and for any injury sus-
tained to her reputation, person, prop-
trty, character, or any natural right, she
shall have the same right to appeal in
'her own name alone to the courts of law
or equity, for redress and protection,
that her husband has to appeal in his
own name alone; prvided, this Act
shall not confer upon the wife the right
to vote or hold office, except as other-
wise provided by law."
[The right of suits between married
p-ersons is expressly recognized in chap..
211 (Compiled L. 887)--" 526o. No
person offered as a witness in any action,
or special proceeding, in any court, or
before any officer, or person having au-
thority to examine witnesses, or hear
evidence, shall be excluded, or excused,
by reason of such person's interest in
the event of the action or special pro-
ceeding; or because such person is a
party thereto; or because such person
is a husband or wife of a party thereto,
or of any person in whose behalf such
action or special proceeding is brought,
prosecuted, opposed, or defended, ex-
cept as hereinafter provided: i. A hus-
band cannot be examined for or against
his wife, without her consent; nor awife
for or against her husband, without his
consent; nor can either, during the
marriage, or afterward, be, without the
consent of the other, examined as to any
communication made by one to the other
during the marriage; but this subdi-
vision does not apply to a civil action,
or proceeding, by one against the other,
nor to a criminal action, or proceeding
for a crime committed by one against
the other."
[By " 4873. When a married wo-
man is a party, her appearance, the
prosecution or defense of the action,
and the joinder with her, of any other
person or party, must be governed by
the same rules as if she were single."
Id. p. 828.
[The Delaware Act of April 9, 1873
(chap. 550, vol. 14, Laws; Rev. Stat.
1874, P- 479), makes all of her property
and wages her sole and separate estate,
and provides-" SEc. 4. That any mar-
ried woman may prosecute and defend
suits at law, or in equity, for the preser-
vation and protection of her property, as
if unmarried, or may do it jointly with
her husband, but he alone cannot main-
tain an action, representing his wife's
property; and it shall be lawful for any
married woman to make any and all
manner of contracts necessary to be
made with respect to her own property,
and suits may be maintained on such
contracts, as though the party making
them was a feme sole."
[Florida, by Act of March 6, 1845
(Digest, p. 755), makes the wife's prop-
erty "separate and independent," but
"in the care and management of her
husband," and then provides-" SEC. 5.
Any married woman having separate
and intlependent title to property, under
and by virtue of Sections 3 and 4 of this
chapter, shall not be entitled to sue her
husband for the rent, hire, issues, pro-
ceeds, or profits of said property, nor
shall the husband charge for his man-
agement and care of the property of the
wife."
In Georgia, by 1774, Code of 1882,
p. 4o8-"A married woman may sue
and be sued, without joining her hus-
band in the action, in any of the courts
of this State, in the following cases:
ist, when the action concerns her sepa-
rate property; 2d, when the action is
between herself and husband; 3d, when
she is living separate and apart from her
husband. In no case shall she be re-
SMALL V. SMALL.
quired to prosecute, or defend, by a
guardian or next friend."
[In Idaho, by Rev. Stat. 18 87,p. 441
-- 4093. When a married woman is a
party [to a civil action], her husband
must be joined with her: except-I.
When the action concerns her separate
property, or her right or claim to the
homestead property, she may sue alone:
2. When the action is between herself
and her husband, she may sue and be
sued alone: 3. When she is living
separate and apart from her husband, by
reason of his desertion of her, or by
agreement in writing entered into be-
tween them, she may sue or be sued
alone.
[In case of an action for the recovery
of real property, where her husband is
a necessary party, the wife has five years
after discoverture, to commence her ac-
tion, before the bar of the statute will
apply, as provided in California, sup ra,
p. 755-
In Chestnut v. Chestnut (1875), 77
Ill. 346, it was held that a proceeding
by sd. fa., commenced by a wife against
her husband, upon a supposed record of
an order for the payment of temporary
alimony, could not be sustained, as there
was no statute in the State abrogating
the common law in this respect.
["An Act to revise the law in rela-
tion to husband and wife," approved
March 30, 1874 (R. S. p. 576), provides
-1 io. Should either husband, or
wife, unlawfully obtain, or retain; pos-
session, or control, of property belonging
to the other, either before, or after, mar-
riage, the owner of the property may
maintain an action therefor, or for any
right growing out of the same, in the
same manner, and to the same extent,
as if they were unmarried."
[Commenting uron this statute, HiG-
BEE, P.J. (Larison v. Larison (1881), 9
Bradw. (Ill.) 27,3), said-" It is a well
settled rule of law, that where a new
remedy is given by statute, it does not
take away the existing remedy, unless
the statute expressly so provides; and
it is insisted by defendant in error that,
as the remedy for an injury to the prop-
erty of a married woman by her husband,
was in equity at common law, this sec-
tion is to be treated as cumulative, and
as giving a new remedy without taking
away the old. Had the rights of the
parties remained the same as they were
at common law, such would have been
the correct construction of this section;
but this statute does more than give a
new remedy-it changes the entire
rights of the parties, it removes the dis-
ability of marriage, and creates the wife
a feme sole for the purpose of acquiring,
managing, and disposing of property;
and of contracting and being contracted
with; confers upon her the legal title
to her property, recognizes her separate
existence, and gives her a legal standing
in the courts of law, which she did not
before possess, and these new rights
must be enforced in a court of law, the
same as if she were afeme sole. * * * * *
Her right to the property is a naked,
legal right, and a court of law is fully
adequate to its protection. Under such
circumstances, the use and enjoyment
of the property between husband and
wife, while residing together as such, is
not the proper subject for the interfer-
ence of a court of chancery, unless to
prevent irreparable injury." A billfiled
by the wife was accordingly dismissed.
["An Act in regard to Evidence and
Depositions in Civil Cases," approved
March 29, 1872 (Laws of x871-2, p.
4o5), as amended by an Act approved
January 21, x874 (Laws of 1873-4, p.
98, i)-" No husband, or wife, shall,
by virtue of Section One of this Act, be
rendered competent to testify for, or
against, each other, as to any transac-
tion, or conversattion, occurring during
the marriage, whether called as a wit-
ness during the existence of the mar-
riage, or after its dis-o!u:ion, except in
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cases where the wife would, if unmar-
ried, be plaintiff or defendant, or where
the cause of action grows out of a per-
sonal wrong, or injury, done by one to
the other, or grows out of the neglect of
the husband to furnish the wife with a
suitable support; and except in cases
where the litigation shall be concerning
the separate property of the wife, and
suits for divorce; and except, also, in
actions upon policies of insurance of
property, so far as relates to the amount
and value of the property alleged to be
insured or destroyed, or in actions
against carriers, so far as relates to the
loss of property and the amount and
value thereof, or in all matters of busi-
ness transactions, where the transaction
was had and conducted bysuch married
woman as the agent of her husband, in
all of which cases the husband and wife
may testify for or against each other, in
the same manner as other parties may,
under the provisiohs of this Act: Pro-
vided, that nothing in this section con-
tained, shall be construed to authorize,
or permit, any such husband or wife to
testify to any admissions or conversations
of the other, whether made by him to
her or by her to him, or by either to
third persons, except in suits and causes
between such husband and wife."
[In Thonas v. .lheller (883), io6
II. 41, WALKER, J., in delivering the
opinion of the Court, said: "As to the
management and control of her prop-
erty, the wife is almost entirely emanci-
pated from all power of the husband.
She may buy and sell property, and sue
and be sued in reference to it, indepen-
dent of his control, and the eighth sec-
tion, in terms, limits their power to sue
each other for compensation for labor
performed or services rendered for the
other, whether in the management of
property or otherwise. From this it is
manifest that the Legislature intended
to remove all restrictions on their power.
to contract with each other, and to en-
able them to sue each other on such
contracts, in the same manner as if they
were not married." The Court sustained
a judgment confessed to the wife by the
husband, and dismissed a creditor's bill
which had been filed for the setting
aside of the confessed judgment as an
obstruction to the collection of the cred-
itor's debt due from the husband.
[Indiana Rev. Stat. 1888 (vol. i,
ch. 2),provide that-" 254. A married
woman may sue alone: First. vhen
the action concerns her separate prop-
erty. Second. When the action is be-
tween herself and her husband; but in
no case shall she be required to sue or
defend by guardian or next friend, ex-
cept she be under the age of twenty-one
years."
[And by " 296. Any person, being
under legal disabilities when the cause
of action accrues, may bring his action
within two years after the disability is
removed." This section was defined
by the Code of Civil Procedure (Rev.
Stat. 1876, vol. 2, p. 3 13), thus-" 797.
In the construction of this Act, the fol-
lowing rules shall be observed, when
consistent with the context: * * * the
phrase ' under legal disabilities,' in-
cludes.married women, * * ." Under
this section, Bauman v. Grubbs (1866),
26 Ind. 419, and liaren v. Matson
(1878), 63 Id. 143, were decided. But
the Civil Code of 1881 (Rev. Stat. I888,
1285), in re-enacting this section,
omitted the words "married woman,"
as was done in California: v.P. 755,
sup)-a.
[Harrdl v. Harrell was a case de-
cided in the Supreme Court of Indiana,
January 24, 1889, in which the husband
sued his wife to recover money loaned,
ELLIOTT, C. J., saying: "There is no
reason why she may not borrow money
from her husband, to enable her to con-
duct her separate business, and prevent
the sacrifice of her property. If she
does voluntarily Lorrow from him under
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an express contract, and there is neither
fraud nor oppression, nor any injustice,
no valid reason exists why she should
not be compelled to pay him, for he is
her creditor. The relationship between
the parties does, however, exert an im-
portant influence upon the contracts of
the wife. It is doubtless incumbent on
the husband to show an express con-
tract, and its consideration, as well as
good faith and voluntary action. We
very much doubt whether he could re-
cover without alleging and proving the
express contract, and its consideration,
in any case. Certainly he could not
recover money placed in the hands of
his wife, without showing the purpose
for which she obtained it, and an ex-
press promise to repay it. * ** Where
there is full consideration yielded by
the husband, entire good faith, an ex-
press contract, and the money is received
by the wife for the benefit of her sepa-
rate estate, and to prevent injury to that
estate, or loss to the wife, the courts
cannot do otherwise than uphold the
claim of which the contract forms the
element."
[Crater v. Crater (decided April 27,
x889), in the same State, was an action
by the wife against her husband, in the
court below, to recover the possession
of land. As a contract made in 1866,
by a married woman, to give her hus-
band half her land, to be held by them
as joint tenants, in consideration of his
agreement to discharge a lien thereon,
was void, the Court held that such a
contract, and the performance thereof
on the husband's part, were no defence
to ejectment by the wife. COFFEY, J.,
said: "It is settled law in this State,
that the wife may sue the husband in
relation to her separate property: WriY-
Ainsv. Miller (1857), 9 Ind. I00; Scott
v. Scott (1859), 13 Id. 225. * * * *
In New York, under statutes very sim-
ilar to our own, it was held that the
wife might maintain an action of eject-
ment against her husband for her sepa-
rate real estate: Wood v. Wood (1881),
83 N. Y. 575. It is our opinion that
the wife, in this State, may maintain an
action of ejectment against her husband
to recover the possession of her separate
real estate."
[The Revised Code of Iowa (1888)
provides that-" 2562. A married
woman may, in all cases, sue and be
sued, without joining her husband with
her, to the same extent as if she were
unmarried, and an attachment, or judg-
ment, in such action shall be entered
by, or against, her as if she were a
single woman."
[And by " 3641. Neither husband
nor wife shall in any case be a witness
against the other, except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed one
against the other; or in a civil action or
proceeding one against the other, but
they may in all civil and criminal cases
be witnesses for each other."
In Peters v. Peters (1875), 42 Iowa
182, an action was brought by the
wife against her husband, for damages
on account of batteries and assaults:
But the right of action was denied by
the Supreme Court. The sections of
the code mainly relied upon by the de-
fence were-
2211. ,A wife may receive the
wages of her personal labor, and main-
tain an action therefor, in her own
name, and hold the same in her own
right; and she may prosecute and de-
fend all actions, at law or in equity, for
the preservation and protection of her
rights and property, as if unmarried."
2204. "Should either the hus-
band, or wife, obtain possession or con-
trol of property belonging to the other,
either before or after marriage, the
owner of the propety may maintain an
action therefor, or for any right growing
out of the same, in the same manner
and extent as if they were unmarried."
The argument, as ingenious as it was
SMALL V. SMALL.
fallacious, tried to express that if the
wife could sue the husband for" her
properly, the right of the wife to sue
the husband for a tort exists, for that
right was property; therefore the wife
might maintain an action against the
husband for a tort.
In johnson v. Barnes (1886),69 Iowa
641, a husband abandoned his wife and
child; the wife maintained the child
and brought an action against the hus-
band to recover, for such expenses, but
SERVERS, J., said: "The Code, 2214,
provides that Ithe expenses of the family,
and the education of the children, are
chargeable upon the property of both
the husband and wife, or either of them,
and, in relation thereto, they may be
sued jointly, or separately.' We do not
think such inquiries can, or should be,
entered into, but that, under the statute,
both parents are bound to contribute to
the support of the children, and that
when one does so, a promise to pay, in
favor of one and against the other, can-
not be implied."
[In Kansas (Comp. Laws, x885, ch.
62, p. 536), by " 3349. A woman,
while married, may sue and be sued, in
the same manner as if she were unmar-
ried." And (Id. ch. 8o, p. 6o9) by
" 3822. A married woman may sue
and be sued in the same manner as if
she were unmarried."
[The Kentucky Act relating to Prac-
tice in Civil Cases (ed. i888, p. 33)
provides that--" 34. In actions be-
tween husband and wife; in actions
concerning her separate property; and
in actions concerning her general prop-
erty in which he refuses to unite, she
may sue or be sued alone."
[By Gen. Stat. Ky. (chap. 7, Art. I,
1887, p. 8 8 5)-" 2. If, at the time the
right of any person to bring an action
for the recovery of real property first
accrued, such person was an infant,
married woman, or of unsound mind,
then such person, or the person claiming
through him, may, though the period of
fifteen years has expired, bring the action
within three years after the time such
disability is removed."
[And by (chap. 71, Art. II., p. 888)
i. No action at law, or in equity,
shall be brought, under or by virtue of
an adverse, interfering entry, survey, or
patent, to recover the title or possession
of land from an occupant, where he, or
the person under whom he claims, has
a connected title thereto, in law or
equity, deducible of record from the
commonwealth, and has, or shall have
had, an actual occupancy of the same
by settlement thereon, under such title,
for seven years before the commence-
ment of the action; and such possession
of land shall bar and toll the right of
entry into such land by any person,
under an adverse title or claim, and such
possession as will bar the right to re-
cover the same, shall vest the title in
the occupant or vendee. This limitation
shall not apply to a person who is an
infant, a married woman of unsound
mind, or out of the United States in the
employment of the United States, or of
this State, at the time the cause of action
accrued, nor until seven years after the
removal of such disability; but the dis-
ability if one of several claimants shall
save only his own right, and not that of
another."
[In Louisiana (Rev. Civil Code 1889,
ch. 5, Art. 121, p. 65), "The wife can-
not appear in court without the authority
of her husband, although she may be a
public merchant, or possess her property
separate from her husband."
[And (Art. 124, p. 65), "If the hus-
band refuses to empower his wife to
appear in court, the judge may give such
authority."
[And (Art. 132, p. 67), "If the hus-
band is under interdiction [i.e., declared
to be in an habitual state of imbecility,
insanity, or madness: Id. Art. 389], or
absent, the judge may, when satisfied of
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the fact, authorize the wife to sue or be
sued, or to make contracts."
[And also (Art. 123, p. 65), "The
woman separated from bed and board,
has no need, in any case, of the author-
ization of her husband, as this separation
carries with it not only a separation of
property, but a dissolution of the com-
munity of acquets and gains."
[In Hawthorne v. Clark (1887), 39
La. An. 678, William Clark conveyed
certain immovable property to Mary
Quirk, and a few weeks later, married
her. The parties subsequently separated,
and Clark made a simulated title to his
son-in-law. The suit was dismissed,
and the dismissal was affirmed, TODD,
J., saying: "During the existence of
the marriage, Clark could bring no suit
against his wife, to have the sale an-
nulled."
In Abbott v. Abbott (1877), 67 Me.
304, an action was brought by a wife,
after divorce, against her husband, for
an assault committed during coverture.
PETERs, J. "Can an action of tort for
such an injury, instituted after divorce,
be sustained by her against her former
husband? It cannot be maintained.
The theory upon which the present
action is sought to be maintained, is
that coverture merely suspends the re-
medy of the wife against her husband.
The doctrine advocated finds no sup-
port from any of the principles of the
common law. By the earliest edicts of
the courts, he had a right to strike her
as a punishment for her misconduct, and
her only remedy was that ' she hath re-
taliation to beat him again if she dare.'
Chancellor KENT lays down the doc-
trine, not contradicted, or challenged
in any of the editions of his Commen-
taries, that ,as the husband is the
guardian of the wife, and bound to
protect and maintain her, the law has
given him considerable and reasonable
superiority and control over her person,
and he may even put gentle restraints
upon her liberty, if her conduct be such
as to require it, unless he renounces
that control by articles of separation,
or it be taken from him by a qualified
divorce': 2 Kent Comm. I8o. For
many years a gradual evolution of the
law has been going on, for the ameliora-
tion of the married woman's condition,
until it is now, undoubtedly, the law of
England and of all the American States,
that the husband has no right to strike
his wife, or t6 punish her, under any
circumstances or provocation whatever.
* ** We believe a rule which forbids
all such opportunities for law suits and
speculations to be wise aAd salutary and
to stand on the solid foundations of the
law. * * * She has the privilege of the
writ of habeas cortus, if unlawfully re-
strained; as a last resort, she can prose-
cute a suit for divorce."
The same ruling was made in P hlifis
v. Barnet (1870),L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 4 3 6;
Longendyke v. Longendyke (z863), 44
Barb. (N. Y.) 366; Schultz v. Schultz
(1882), 63 How. (Id.) xSx, affirmed on
appeal in 27 Hun. (Id.) 26 (1882), but
reversed in the Court of Appeals (1882),
89 N. Y. 644.
In Hobbs v. Hobbs (1879), 70 Me.
381, an action of assumpsit was brought
by a wife against her husband, upon an
account annexed. APPLETON, C. J., said:
"The question presented is, whether
either party to the marriage contract
can sue the other while the marriage
relation subsists. By the Act of 1876,
C. 112 (Rev. Stat. 1883, p. 524),
'She may prosecute and defend suits
at law or in equity, either of tort or
contract, in her own name, without
the joinder of her husband, for the pre-
servation and protection of her property
and personal rights, or for the redress
of her injuries, as if unmarried, or may
do it jointly with her husband, and the
husband shall not settle or discharge
any such action, or cause of action, with-
out the written consent of the wife.'
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Under previous decisions of this Court,
it has been held that neither husband
or wife can sue the other directly in
assumpsit."
In Crowther v. Crowther (1868), 55
Me. 358, the Court held that this statute
was not intended to give such a right.
The wife could not maintain an action
against her husband during the exist-
ence of the marriage relation.
[The wife not being allowed to sue
the husband, the period of limitation is
extended, by Rev. Stat. Maine (ed.
1883, p. 688, chap. 8x,) 1" 88. If a
person entitled to bring any of the
aforesaid [i.e. personal] actions, is a
minor, or married woman, insane, im-
prisoned, or without the limits of the
United States, when the cause'of action
accrues, the 'action may be brought
within the times limited herein, after
the disability is removed." And also by
(p. 824, chap. 1O5,) "7. When such
right of entry, or action, first accrues, if
the person entitled thereto is a minor,
married woman, insane, imprisoned, or
absent from the United States, he, or
any one claiming under him, may make
the entry, or bring the action, at any
time within ten years after such disab-
ility is removed, notwithstanding twenty
years have expired."
[After the dissolution of the marriage
by divorce, the objection to the main-
tenance of an action at common law,
arising from the marital relation, no
longer exists, and it is not necessary to
resort to equity, the action may be main-
tained at common law: Blake v. Blake
(1874), 64Me. 77; Wester v. Web-
ster (1870,) 58 Id. 139.
[In Maryland (Pub. Gen. Laws,
x888. vol. %, Art. 45, Sec. 4, P. 802.)
"A married woman having no trustee,
may, by her next friend, sue in a court
of law or equity, in all cases for the
recovery, or security, or protection of
her property, as fully as if she were a
feme sole.
[And (Id. 7,) "Any marfied woman,
who by her skill, industry, or personal
labor, shall earn any money, or other
property, real, personal or mixed, shall
hold the same, and the fruits, increase
and profits thereof, to her sole and
separate use, with power as afeme sole,
to invest, re-invest, devise, bequeath,
sell and dispose of the same; provided,
that such money, or property, shall be
liable for the payment of any claim, or
debt, incurred by such married woman,
in and about the business, occupa-
tion or ente~prise in which said money
or other property shall be earned or
invested; and for any such debt, said
married woman may be sued before
any justice of the peace, or court of
this State (whichever shall have juris-
diction, as determined by the amount
of said debt) as if she were afrmesole;
and any such property may be taken in
execution to satisfy any judgment rend-
ered on such cause of action; provided,
that the husband of such married woman
shall have the right to appear and de-
fend any such suit in her name; and no
judgment shall be entered in any such
suit against such married woman with-
out proof, unless by the joint consent, in
writing, of herself and husband; pro.
vided further, that any married woman
may sue in any court of law or equity
in this State, upon any cause of action,
in her own name, and without the neces-
sity of a prohe/in ami, as if she were
feme sole."
In Edwards v. Stevens (1862), 3
Allen (Mass.) 315, it was decided that
a married woman could not bring an
action against parties of whom her
husband was one, to recover compen-
sation for services under Gen. Stat., C.
io8. The decision was on the ground
that while the statute authorized her to
"carry on any trade or business, and
perform any labor or services on her
sole and separate account, and sue and
be sued in all matters having relation
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to her separate property, business, trade,
services, labor and earnings, in the same
manner as if she were sole," yet in
order to make a valid contract with her
husband, he should also have the power
to contract as if he were sole, which was
nowhere given him. HOAR, J., called
attention to Lord v. Parker (1861), at
p. 127 in the same report, where it was
settled "that a married woman cannot
form a copartnership in business with
her husband, for the reason, among
others, that the true construction of the'
statutes [of 855 , C. 304, H 3 and 7 (of
which 3 became 3 of C. io8 of Gen-
Stat.) and of 1857, C. 249, ? 2,] which
authorize her to carry on business upon
her sole and separate account, do not
confer upon her the power to make a
contract with her husband. That case
is decisive of the present. These
statutes are in derogation of the com-
mon law, and are not to be extended
by implication" : Id. p. 315. To the
same effect: Bowker v. Bradford
(x886), 140 Mass. 521.
[The Pub. Stat. (ed. 1882, ch. x47,
p. 819,) afterwards specifically provided
-" SEm. 2. A married woman may
make contracts, oral and written, sealed
and unsealed in the same manner as if
she were sole, except that she shall not
be authorized hereby to make contracts
with her husband." And, by-"SEc. 7.
A married woman may sue and be sued,
in the same manner as if she were sole,
but this section shall not be construed
to authorize suits between husband and
wife."
[And now it must be considered as
established that a wife cannot enforce a
note held by her, against her husband,
even if originally made to a third per-
son and endorsed to her. "As apromise
to pay, the note is no longer valid :" C.
ALLEN, J., Wiron v. Bryant (1883),
134 Mass. 291,300. This, of course, is
during coverture, as upon divorce, there
is no further disability: Cazhin v.
Chapin (1883), 135 Id. 393-
[Michigan (Howell's Ann. Stat., ed
1883, p. z638,) provides-" 6297. Ac-
tions may be brought by and against a
married woman, in relation to her sole
property, in the same manner as if she
were unmarried, and in cases where the
property of the husband cannot be sold,
mortgaged or otherwise encumbered,
without the consent of the wife, to be
given in the manner prescribed by law,
or when his property is exempted by
law, from sale on execution, or other
final process, issued from any court,
against him, his wife may bring an ac-
tion in her own name, with the like
effect as in cases of actions in relation
to her sole property, as aforesaid."
[And (p. 1635) by " 6295. That
the real and personal estate of every
female, acquired before marriage, and.
all property, real and personal, to which
she may afterwards become entitled, by-
gift, grant, inheritance, devise, or in.
any other manner, shall be and remain
the estate and property of such female,
and shall not be liable for the debts,
obligations and engagements of her
husband, and may b? contracted, sold,
transferred, mortgaged, conveyed, de-
vised or bequeathed by her, in the same
manner, and with like effect, as if she
were unmarried." This section was
originally enacted as Section one of the
Statute of February 13, 1855, alluded
to in the next case.
InJenne v. Afarble (1877), 37 Mich.
319, a man leased certain farms to his
wife, and sold her certain animals. The
lease contained clauses of eviction.
The wife's contract to pay was execu-
tory, and she bound herself by her per-
sonal covenant. And CAMPBELL, J.,
ruled that such a contract could not be
enforced by the husband's assignee, in
,an action at common law. "If we hold
that the contract before us is valid, we
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must do so on the ground thathusbands
and wives can contract with each other,
just as freely as strangers can, and may
sue each other just as freely, at law or
in equity. No ground short of this
can maintain this action. We think
the statutes have not gone far enough
to allow this, and that, so far as hus-
bands and wives are concerned, they
cannot contract with each other in any
larger sense than they could formerly in
equity, except that their contracts, when
valid, may be enforced at law, where
legal in form. Unless impliedly re-
pealed, there can be no question as to
the disability, under the whole code of
statutes prior to the law of 1855, and
the language of that statute is no broader
than the equitable rule concerning
separate property, laid down in the
same words, in most of the old deci-
sions:" Id. 325.
In White v. White (x885), 58 Mich.
546, it was decided that a wife might
maintain an action of replevin against
her husband, living apart from her, for
her individual property, after making
due demand-therefor. And see Carney
v. Gleissner (1885), 62 WIs. 493, in
which such an action was sustained
under A 2345 R. S. of Wisconsin.
In Moore v. Foote (1876), 34 Mich.
443, a wife held a.lawful claim against
a firm of which her husband was a
member, and it was decided that she
was not precluded from recovering upon
it because of any incidental wrong that
might result to one of the members of
the firm.
[Hence, in Benson v. Morgan (1883),
5o Mich. 77, a married woman, in suing
a firm of which her husband is a part-
ner, must implead him as defendant, if
the partners are not severally liable, in
order to maintain her action. Here the
wife was employed, with her husband's
consent, by a firm in which he was in-
terested, and which had full knowledge
of her claims against them for her Ia-
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bor; and she was not bound by any-
settlement therefor, made between her
husband and the firm, without her-
authority.
[The competency of husband and"
wife as witnesses against each other, is
now fixed by a statute, approved June-
17, 1885 (Pub. Acts, p. 287), amend-
ing Howell's Ann. StaL 7546, by in--
serting the words in Irackets,-"A.
husband shall not be examined as w.
witness, for or rgainst his wife, without
her consent; nor a wife, for or against
her husband, without his consent, (ex-
cept in cases where the cause of actio.
grows out of a personal wrong or injury.
done by one to the other, or grows out
of the refusal or neglect to furnish the
wife or children with suitable support,.
within the meaning of Act No. 336 of'
the session laws of 1883, and) except in.
cases where the husband or wife shall
be a party to the record, in a suit, action,
or proceeding where the title to the
separate property of the husband or wife,
so called or offered as a witness, or
where the title to property derived
from, through, or under the hus-
band or wife, so called or offered as at
witness, shall be the subject matter irk
controversy or litigation, in such suit,
action, or proceeding, in opposition to,
the claim or interest of the other of said
married persons, who is a party to the
record in such suit, action, or proceed-
ing; and in all such cases, such hus-
band or wife who makes such claim of
title, or under, or from whom such title-
is derived, shall be as competent to
testify in relation to said sepapate pro-
perty and the title thereto, without the
consent of said husband or wife, who is
a party to the record ia such suit, action
or proceeding, as tbnh such marriage
relation did no V nor shall either,
during the mariie or afterwards, with-
out th -' AAF both, be examined as
to any c.jmj ri;ication made by one to
the other, ti'rring the marriage; but in
765;
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any action or proceeding instituted by
the husband or wife, in consequence of
adultery, the husband and wife shall
not be competent to testify."
[Minnesota. (Rev. Stat. x878, ch. 66,
P. 710,)-"J 29. A married woman
may sue or be sued as if unmarried,
and without joining her husband, in all
-cases where the husband would not be
:a necessary party aside from the marriage
relation." Of course, the wife appears
-alone in actions between her husband
and herself: FLANDRAU, J. Wolf v.
Banning (1859), 3 Minn. 202, 2o6.
[The Rev. Stat. also provide (Ch. 73,
Tit. a, p. 792, as amended by Ch. 72,
Gen. L. z889, p. z86, by adding the
words in italics,)-" io. A husband
cannot be examined for or against his
"wife, without her consent; nor a wife
for or against her husband, without his
-consent; nor can either, during the
umarriage or afterwards, be, without the
,consent of the other, examined as to
any communication made by one to the
other during the marriage; but this ex-
ception does not apply to a civil action
or proceeding by one against the other,
nor to a criminal action or proceeding
for a crime committed by one against
the other. Nor to proceeding sugplk-
mentary to execution.
[Mississippi, (Rev. Code, ed. i88o,
P. 339,) enacts-" 1167. The Com-
mon Law, as to the disabilities of
married women, and its effects on the
rights of property of the wife, is totally
abrogated, and marriage shall not be
held to impose any disability or incap-
acity on a woman, as to the ownership,
acquisition, or disposition of property of
any sort, or as to her capacity'to make
contracts, and do all acts in reference to
property, which she could lawfully do,
if she was not married; but every
woman now married, or hereafter to be
married, shall hare- the same capacity
to acquire, hold, manage,, control, use,
enjoy, and dispose of all protierty, real
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and personal, in possession or expect-
ancy, and to make any contract in refer-
ence to it, and to bind herself personally,
and to sue and be sued, with all the
rights and liabilities incident thereto,
as if she was not married."
V" 1168. Husband and wife may
sue each other."
[As early as x838, on an appeal from
Chancery, the High Court of Errors and
Appeals said: "The first objection to
the proceedings below is, that the appel-
lant, being a fene covert, exhibited her
bill alone, against her husband. No
doubt the wife was under a legal inca-
pacity to bring a suit alone against her
husband, and should have prosecuted
her claim through the intervention of a
troc ein ami; yet when the incapacity
appeared upon the face of the bill, as in
the present case, the defendant must
take advantage of it by demurrer:
Coop. Eq. Plead. 163. [z Dan. Chan.
Pldg. * 556.] The defendant having
answered, the objection comes too late.
It was urged by counsel, that the right
of demurrer having been reserved in the
answer, it was competent for them to
make any defence that could have been
made under a demurrer filed. We have
found no authority to sustain this posi-
tion; and we deem it a direct violation
of the well-settled rule, which precludes
a party from demurring and answering
to the same part, or the whole of a bill:"
PRAY, J., Zenley v. IenlO (1838), 2
How. (Miss.) 751, 753-
[By Miss. Rev. Code (ed. z88o, p.
447)-" 16oI. Husbandandwifemay
be introduced by each other, as wit-
nesses in all cases, civil and criminal."
[In Missouri (Rev. Stat, ed. 1879,
p. 592, chap. 59, Art. I.), by " .3468.
When a married woman is a party, her
husband must be joined with her in all.
actions, except those in which the hus-
band is a sole plaintiff and the wife a
sole defendant, or the wife a plaintiff
and the husband a defendant, and in all
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such actions, it shall be lawful for the
wife to sue, or defend, by her agent or
attorney, as she may think proper, and
in all actions by husband and wife, or
against husband and wife, they may
prosecute the same by attorney; or
they, or either, may defend by attorney;
and it shall not be necessary for the
wife, in any such case, to sue with her
husband, by next friend, or to appear
and defend by next friend."
[And the husband has, during the
.coverture, the right of possession of the
wife's real estate, unless (by 3292) he
give cause for the proper Circuit Court
to intervene, as shown in Deguzaie v.
St. Jos. Lead Co. (1889), U.S. Circ. CL
E. Dist. Mo., 37 Fed. Repr. 663, and
Dyer v. Wittler (1886), 89 Mo. 8I, the
wife's power to sue him would ordina-
rily relate to her personalty, in respect
to which tie Rev. Stat. (ed. 1879, p.
560, chap. 51,) provide--" 3296. Any
personal property, including rights in
action, belonging to any woman at her
marriage, or which may have come to
her during coverture, by gift, bequest,
or inheritance, or by purchase with her
separate money or means, or be due as
the wages of her separate labor, or have
grown out of any violation of her per-
sonal rights, shall, together with all in-
come, increase and profits thereof,, be
and remain her separate property and
under her separate control, and shall
not be liable to be taken by any process
of law, for the debts of her husband.
This section shall not affect the title of
any husband to any personal property
reduced to his possession with the ex-
press consent of his wife: provided, that
said personal property shall not be
deemed to have been reduced to posses-
sion, by the husband, by his use, occu-
pancy, care or protection thereof; but
the same shall remain her separate
property, unlesi by the terms of said
assent, in writing, full authority shall
have been given by the wife to the bus-
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band, to sell, incumber, or otherwise
dispose of the same, for his own use and
benefit; but such property shall be sub-
ject to execution for the payments of the
debts of the wife, contracted before mar-
riage, and for any debt, or liability, of
her husband, created for necessaries for
the wife or family: and [added by
amendatory Act of March I6, 1883,
Laws, p. 1I3,] any such married woman
may, in her own name, and without
joining her husband as a party plaintiff,
institute and maintain any action, in
any of the courts of this State, having
jurisdiction, for the recovery of any such
personal property, including rights of
action, as aforesaid, with the same force
and effect as if such married woman,
was a fente sole; provided, any judg-
ment for costs, in any such proceedings,
rendered against any such married wo-
man, maybe satisfied out of any separate.
property of such married woman, subject
to execution."
[Montana provides (by 7 of Act of
March 3, 1887; Comp. Stat. 1888, p.
61)-" SEC. 7. A married woman may
sue and be sued, in the same manner as
if she were sole."
[And (by i of Act of March 3,
x887; Comp. Stat. x888, p. 1045)-
"SEC.A1439. That, from and after the
passage of this Act, woman shall retain
the same legal existence and legal per-
sonality after marriage, as before mar-
riage, and shall receive the same pro-
tection of all her rights as a woman,
which her husband does as a man; and
for any injury sustained to her reputa-
tion, person, property, character, or any
natural right, she shall have. the same
right to appeal in her own name alone
to the courts of law, or equity, for re-
dress and protection, that her husband
has to appeal in his own name alone:
Provided, This Act shall not confer
upon the wife a right to vote, or hold
office, except as is otherwise provided
by law."
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[Nebraska (Act of June x, 1871;
Laws 1875, p. 8 8; Comp. Stat. ed. 1885,
p. 423, ch. 53) provides-" SEC. 3. A
woman may, while married, sue and be
sued, in the same manner as if she were
unmarried." In Mfay v. .May (1879),
9 Neb. 6, an action by a wife against
her husband, on two promissory notes,
was sustained. One note had been
made to a third person and assigned to
the wife; and both had been made dur-
ing coverture. "This capacity to sue
is not limited, and no person, or class
of persons, is excepted from its effect.
If she were unmarried, there could be
no doubt that she could sue this same
man. This statute (as I understand it)
. plainly provides that she can do the
same thing, though married to him:"
COBB, J., p. 25.
[This statute "has wholly removed
the common law disability of a married
woman :" GArNT, J., Poe v. Hoter
(1877), 6 Neb. 178, 387..
[Nevada (Act of March Jo, 1873, p.
193, J 25; Gen. Stat. 1885, p, x47)
permits-" Sec. 523. When the wife is
living separate and apart from her hus-
band, she maysue, and be sued, alone."
And (by 1 7 of Actof March 8, x869,
p. x96; Gen. Stat. 1885, p. 756)-
" SC. 3029. When a married woman is
a party, her husband shall be joined
with her, except that: First. When the
action concerns her separate property,
she maysuealone. Second. Whenthe
action is between herself and her hus-
band, she may sue, or be sued, alone."
[By the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Statute of x881 (Gen. Stat.
1885, p. 833)-" SEc. 3403. A husband
cannot be examined as a witness for, or
against, his wife, without her consent,
nor a wife, for, or against, her husband,
without his consent; nor can either,
during the marriage, or afterwards, be,
without the consent of the other, exam-
ined as to any communication made by
one to the other during marriage. But
this exception shall not apply to an ac-
tion, or proceeding, by one against the
other."
[And by Act of November 21, 186z
(Gen. Stat. 1885, p. 878)-" SEC. 3642.
If a person entitled to commence any
action for the recovery of real property,
or to make an entry, or defense, founded
on the title to real property, or to rents,
or services, out of the same, be, at the
time such title shall first descend, or
accrue, either: first, within the age of
twenty-one years; or, second, insane;
or, third, imprisoned on a criminal
charge, or in execution upon conviction
of a criminal offense, for a term less
than for life; or, fourth, a married wo-
man: SEc. 3643. The time during
which such disability shall continue,
shall not be deemed any portion of the
time in this Act limited for the com-
mencement of such action, or the mak-
ing of such entry or defense, but such
action may be commenced, or entry or
defense made, within the period of five
yeirs after such disability shall cease, or
after the death of the person entitled,
who shall die under such disability; but
such action shall not be commenced,
or entry or defense, made after that
period."
[And by the same (p. 880)-" SEC.
365. If a person entitled to bring an
action other than for the recovery of
real property, except for a penalty, or
forfeiture, or against a sheriff, or other
officer, for an escape, be, at the time the
cause of action accrued, either: first,
within the age of twenty-one years; or,
second, insane; or, third, imprisoned on
a criminal charge, or in execution under
the sentence of a criminal court, for a
term less-than his natural life; or,
fourth, a married woman; the time of
such disability shall not be a part of the-
time limited for the ommencement of
-te action."
[New Hampshire (Gen. Laws x878,
p. 435, ch. 183) enacts that-" SEcr. 12.
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Every married woman shall have the
same rights and remedies, and shall be
subject to the same liabilities in relation
to property held by her in her own
right, as if she were unmarried, and
may aake contracts, and sue and be
sued, in all matters in law and equity,
and upon any contract by her made, or
for any wrong by her done before mar-
riage, as if she were unmarried; pro-
vided, however, that the authority hereby
given to make contracts, shall not affect
the laws heretofore in force as to con-
tracts between husband and wife; and
pirovided also, that no contract, or con-
veyance, by a married woman, of prop-
erty held by her, in her own right, as
surety or guarantor for her husband, nor
any undertaking by her for him, or in
his behalf, shall be binding on her."
[And by the same chapter-" SEcT.
13. Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to empower any husband to
convey any of his property to his wife,
in any other manner, or with any other
effect, than if the same had not been
passed."
[" As was said, in effect, in Houston
v. Clark (1871), 50 N. H. 482, the
statute unquestionably removes all dis-
abilities of the wife so far as regards her
separate property, and gives her the
same rights and remedies with respect
thereto, as though she were sole. The
logical result seems to be, that the status
of marriage interposes no obstacle in
the way of either party maintaining a
suit at law against the other in respect
to those contracts which the wife is em-
powered to make; for a cotbtract, in
form, is no contract, in any legal sense,
unless the law, while recognizing it as
valid, furnishes a remedy for its enforce-
ment. Such right of action was, indeed,
unequivocally recognized in Clerernont
Bank v. Clark-(I865), 46 N. H. 134;
for, if a judgment may be had against
the wife as trustee of her husband, it
must be for the reason that she has in
her hands, money, etc., of her husband,
for which he himself would have been
entitled to judgment, had he, instead of
his creditors, brought the suit; and the
decision is clearly put upon that ground.
If then. the defendant owed a debt to
his wife, which he was legallybound to
pay, there was no reason why he might
not use these notes [which were made
by a third party to him, as payee, and
by him indorsed to his wife in repay-
ment of a loan,] for that purpose, as
well as any other property, or money,
which belonged to him, and the title
thereto would pass to her, unless section
14 [Sect. 13,s"PraJ is to have the con-
struction claimed for it by the plaintiffs'
counsel. ** ** But I think this was
intended to guard against voluntary
conveyances for the purpose of defraud-
ing creditors, and that it cannot be held
to prohiLit the transfer of title in prop-
erty of money, from husband to wife,
for the purpose of paying an honest.
debt:" LADD, J., Clough v. Russell
(1875), 55 N. H. 279, 281.
[The same judge made these remarks,
which might well have been made, in
the principal case: "The plaintiffs'
counsel deprecate this wide departure
from 'the doctrine and practice of the
common law. Fortunately, the policy,
or impolicy of the law, is not a matter
we are to consider. We are to declare
our judgment of its meaning and appli-
cation, and if a mistake is made in
ascertaining the legislative intent, the
legislature is always at hand to correct
it." Id. 281.
[And by Gen. Laws (ed. 1878, p.
531, ch. 228)-"SECr. 2o. A husband
and wife are competent witnesses for,
or against, each other, whether joined
as parties, or not, in all cases, both
civil and criminal. SECT. 21. The pre-
ceding section shall not be so con-
strued as to render competent the testi-
mony of a husband, or wife, for, or
against each other, as to any statement,
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conversation," lett, or other coqmuni-
cation made by either of them to the
other, or to any other person; nor as to
other matters, when it appears to the
court that the examination of either, as
a witness, in relation thereto, would
lead to a violation of marital confi-
dence."
[By the same (p. 51o, ch. 221.)-
"SECT. 2. If the person first entitled to
bring such action (that is, for the re-
covery of real estate] is an infant, a
married woman, or insane, at the time
the right accrues, the action may be
brought within five years after such
disability is removed."
[And by the same (p. 571, ch. 221)
-" SECT. 7. Any infant, married wo-
man, or insane person, may bring any
personal actions within two years after
such disability is removed.
[New Jersey provides (Revision of
1871, ed. 1877, p. 850)--" 15. Every
person of full age and sound memory
may appear and prosecute, or defend,
any action in any of the courts of this
State, in person, or by his solicitor in
chancery, or attorney-at-law."
[And (Id. 637)-" 5- That any mar-
tied woman shall, after the passing of
this Act, have the right to bind herself
by contract, in the same manner and to
the same extent, as though she were
unmarried, and which contracts shall be
legal and obligatoryand may be en-
forced at law or in equity, by or against
such married woman, in her own name,
apart from her husband; prorided, that
nothing herein shall enable such married
woman to become an accommodation
endorser, guarantor, or surety, nor shall
she.be liable on any promise to pay the
debt, or Answer for the default, or lia-
bility, of any other person."
[And (Id. 638)-" i i. That a mar-
ried woman may maintain an action in
her own name, and without joining her
husband therein, for all breaches of con-
tract, and for recovery of all debts,wages,
earnings, money and. all property, both
real and personal, which by this Act is
declared to be her separate property,
and for all damages done thereto, and
she shill have, in her own name, the
sami- remedies for the recovery and pro-
tection of such property as if she were
an unmarried woman; and in any civil
or criminal proceedings, it shall be suffi,
cient to allege such property to be her
property."
[And (Id. 598)---" 24. Thirty years
actual possession of any lands, tene-
ments, or other real estate, uninterrupt-
edly continued as aforesaid, wherever
such possession commenced, or is found-
ed upon a proprietary right duly laid
- thereon, and recorded in the surveyor
general's office of the division in which
such location was made, or in the sec-
retary's office, agreeably to law, or
wherever such possession was obtained
by a fair bona fide purchase of such
lands, tenements, or other real estate,
of any person or persons whatever, in
possession, and supposed to have a legal
right And title thereto, or of. the-agent,
or agents, of such person or persons,
shall be a good and sufficient bar to all
prior locations, rights, titles, convey-
ances, or claims whatever, not followed
by actual possession as aforesaid, and
shall vest an absolute right and title in
the actualpossessor and occupier of all
such lands, tenements, or other real
estate; p ovided al-ways, that if any per-
son or persons having a right or title to
lands, tenements, or other real estate,
,shall, at the time of said right or title
f*-t descended or accrued, be within
.the age of twenty-one years,feme coei,,
non comtos, imprisoned, or without the
United States of America, then such
person or persons, and his and the.
heir and heirs, may, notwithstanding the -
aforesaid times are expired, be entitled
to his or their action for the same, so as
such person or persons, or his or their
heirs. commence or sue forth his or the*
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action within five years after his or their
full age, discoverture, coming of sound
mind, enlargement out of prison, or
coming within any of the United States,
and at no time after; andpravidcdalso,
that any citizen or citizens of this, or any
o:her of the United States, and his or
their heirs, having right or title to any
lands, tenements, or other real estate
within this State, may, notwithstanding
the aforesaid times are expired, com-
mence his or their action for such lands,
tenements, or other real estate, at any
time within five years next after the
passingof this Act, and not afterwards."
[ Yeomans v. Petty, 4dm'r, etc., de-
cided in the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey, October term, 1885, was a case
where the wife brought suit against her
husband's administrator to recover
monies received by the husband as an
advancement for the wife and as part
of her separate estate, used and applied
by the husband in improving his own
farm, and also for money loaned by the
wife to the husband, the defence being
the Statute of Limitations. BIRIb,V. C.,
said: "Until the Statute of Limitations
is expressly extended to such cases, I
cannot think it wise for the Court to
hold that, because the husband or wife,
who has a claim against the other, does
not bring suit therefor, or within the
statutory period, it shall be barred. The
Folicy of the law is to prevent litigation
Letween husband and wife."
[In Chavez v. M'nigt (1857), 1
N. Mex. 150, the right of the wife to
sue her husband was sustained under
the civil law, BROCCHUS, J., saying:
"According to the civil law, a woman,
on marrying, parts with many of her
civil rights, and amongst the rights
alienated by the conjugal association, is
that of appearing generally in court, as
plaintiff, or defendant, alone, or without
the consent of her husband. But she
does not part with the right of prosecut-
ing suits against her husband when
causes of action against him arise,"
citing Eseriche Mujer Casada, 45 1. * * *
"Such are the well-established princi-
ples of the civil law. Although a wife
is thereby prohibited from entering
alone, into litigation with other persons,
without the consent of her husband, she
is not prohibited from instituting and
maintaining suits against him whenevet
she may have a legal or equitable cause
of action."
[Subsequently an Act was passed
(April 2, 1884, chap. 14; Comp. Laws
1884, p. 540), which provides-" 1087.
All property, real, personal, and mixed,
and cboses in action, owned by any
married woman, or owned or held by
any woman at the time of her marriage,
shall continue to be her separate prop-
erty, notwithstanding such marriage;
and any married woman may, during
coverture, receive, take, hold, use, and
enjoy property of any and every descrip-
tion, and all avails of her industry, free
from any liability of her husband, on
account nf his debts, as fully as if she
were unmarried." Andby r88o and
188 (p. 9IO), a wife has three years
after discoverture, to bring actions at
law or in equity, for any lands; and by
I 1869 (p. 906), one year, in other
cases.
In Freethy v. Freethy (1865), 42
Barb. (N. Y.) 641, an action was brought
by the plaintiff, against her husband, to
recover damages for slander. The words
charged were clearly actionable, and the
only question was the right of the wife
to sue her husband under the Statute of
1862, ? 3, which provided that "any
married woman might bring and main-
tain an action, in her own name, for
damages, against any person, or body
corporate, for any injury to her person,
or character, the same as if she were
sole." The plaintiff was nonsuited.
FOSTER, J.: "if the Legislature had in-
tended to include such suits, it would
have used language clearly denoting
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such intention. * ** When the Legis-
lature intends to make such a striking
inmovation of the rules of common law,
and so much opposed to public policy,
and the peace and happiness of the
conjugal relation, as would be the case
if husband and wife were permitted to
sue each other, it should use such lan-
guage as will make it clearly manifest."
[By the New York Code of Civil
IProcedure-" 450. In an action, or
special proceeding, a married woman
-ppears, prosecutes, or defends, alone,
-or joined with other parties, as if she
-was single. It is not necessary, or
proper, to join her husband with her, as
A party, in any action, or special pro-
ceeding, affecting her separate prop-
erty." (The last sentence was added
in x879.) This section is substantially
the same as 7, chap. go, Laws of
i86o, as amended by 1 3, chap. 172,
Lawsof z862, which were both repealed
by' I, chap:245, Laws of i88o, leaving
t&e'Code of Civil Procedure in force.
[In Witney v. Whitney (1867), 49
Barb. (N. Y.) 319, a wife sued her hus-
band to recover a sum of money which
he took'from under her pillow, while
she was asleep. The Court ruled that
a common law action would lie.
[The power of a wife to sue her hus-
band was discussed by ADAMS, J. (Al-
-ward v. Alward, Supreme Ct. N. Y.,
Special Term, Cayuga County, June,
x888), and a "legal" action, with trial
by jury, denied. The case was then
proceeded in as a suit in equity, and a
decree made in favor of the husband for
noney expended, at the request of the
-wife, in the management of her separate
-estate.
[The learned judge pointed out the
,conflict of decisions in New York State,
in the absence of a decision of the Court
-of Appeals, fairly made, upon the pre-
-cise question, and unhampered by other
,complications. "In the case of Wright
v. Wright (1873), 54 N. Y. 437, the
commission of appeals held that a wife
might maintain an action against her
husband, upon a promissory note, and
that it mattered not in what form she
brought her action. In Woodv. Woed
(i88'), 83 -N. Y. 575, it was held that
a wife might maintain ejectment-against
her husband." This case expressly fol-
lowed Wright v. Wright: to the same
effect, Minierv. Minier (187o),4 Lan
(N. Y.) 421, decided under 3, chap.
172, Laws of 1862, Amending 7, chap.
go, Laws of x86o.
["In Howland v. Howland (1880),
2o Hun (N. Y.) 472, it was heid that
she might likewise maintain replevin;
in Berdell v. Parkhurst (1879), 19 Id.
350; s.c. 58 How. (N.Y.) io2,that the
husband might sue his wife for conver-
sion." In the former of these two.
cases Bo.ckDmAN, J., said that "the
weight of authority, and the reason of
the married woman's law, sustain her
right," citing Wright v. Wrigkt, supra;
Perkins v. Perkins (z870), 62 Barb.
(N. Y.) 531; Whitney v. HWqt,
supra; Adams v. Curtis (187o), 4
Ians. (N. Y.) 164. But Perkins v.
Perkins denied that a husband could
maintain an action at law, agaist his
wife, to recover for services rendered,
PoTTR, J., explaining that" Interpret-
ing these statutes (including that of
x862), to be in tari materia, as if all
were contained in one Act, beginning
with those of z848 and z849, entitled
' for the more effectual protection of the
property of married women;' taking
the common law as it has ever been'de-
dared; abrogating none of the com-
mon law, by forced construcion, not
expressed by a statute; and giving due
force to the maxim, exressio umus eg
exdusio alterims, husbands are excluded
from their provisions :" Id. 542.
[ Granger v. Granger (z886), 2 N.
Y. St. Rep. 211, was action by a hus-
band against his wife, upon a promissry
note given by her to her husband, fr
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the benefit of her separate estate : the
action was held to be maintainable as
the parties might contract with each
.other.
[ADA S, J., Alward v. Alward,
4'u0ra, "At first blush, these citations
would seem to be conclusive upon the
,question under consideration. A care-
ful examination convinces me, however,
that so far as it relates to this precise
,question, what is said in the first two
-cases, [ Wright v. Wright and Wood v.
Wood,] is obiter; while the remainder
are overruled, in principle at least, by
some more recent decisions of the Court
-of Appeals. Tho general term in the
fErt department, in the case of Schultz v.
Schultz (1882), 27 Hun (N.Y.) 26, held
that a married woman might sue her
"husband, in a civil action, for assault and
battery. This decision, which is in
direct conflict with those of Freethy v.
Freethy (1865), 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 641,
and Longendike v. Longendike (1863),
44 Id. 366, was placed upon the grond
that the Acts of 1848, 1849,4s86o and
-862 had not only destroyed the unity
,of husband and wife, but had expressly
conferred upon them, the right to sue
each other in any form of action. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the case
was reversed (89 N. Y. 644); and
-although no opinion was written, the
ground upon which the reversal vias
granted, is made quite obvious by the
reference thereto which appears in the
celebrated case of Bertles v. Nunan
(1883), 92 N. Y. i6o," where husband
and wife were held to take by entireties,
on a conveyance of land to them, not-
withstanding this legislation. In this
case, EARL, J., reviewed this legisla-
tion, and concluded that the common
law incidents of marriage were swept
-away onlyby express enactments. "The
ability of the wife to make contracts, is
limited. Her general engagements are
absolutely void, and she can bind her-
self by contract, only as she is expressly
authorized to do so by statute. A hus-
band still has his common law right of
tenancy by the curtesy. Although sec-
tion seven ot the Act of i86o, autho-
rizes a married woman to maintain an
action against any person, for an injury
to her person or character, yet we have
held that she cannot maintain an action
against her husband for such an injury;
and so it was held, notwithstanding the
Acts of 1848, x849 and s86o, that the
common law disability of husband and
wife, growing out of their unity of per-
son, to convey to each other still ex-
isted:" 92 N.Y. i6o. And Bertes v.
Nunan, was affirmed in Zorntlein v.
Brain (1885), ioo N. Y. 13.
[" Neither the Act of 184 8, nor that
of 1849, contains any provision relating
to the bringing of suit by married
women. Obviously, the extent to which
the Legislature" designed to invade the
common law rule by these Acts, was
simply to confer upon married women
the right to take, hold and convey their
separate estate, in the same manner as
though unmarried. BytheAct of 186o,
as thereafter amended by section seven,
chapter 172, Laws of 1862, the addi-
tional right and liability to ' sue and be
sued, i'n all matters relating to her sole
and separate property, * * * in the
same manner as if she were sole,'
was conferred upon her. It is notice-
able that this language of this section is
substantially the same as that of section
three of the Act of 1849, which permits
a married woman to bargain, sell, and
convey her real estate in the same man-
ner, and with like effect, as if she were
unmarried; and yet the Court of Ap-
peals held, in White v. Wager (1862),
25 N.-Y. 328,. that this language did
not enable her to convey directly to her
husband; and this decision has been
acquiesced in, down to within a year
past, when it was abrogated by express
enactment: Laws 1887, c. 537. It
would seem, therefore, that if it required
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specific action on the part of the Legis-
lature, to enable husband and wife to
Jonvey t'eiach oter, it would
ie similar ktion to authorize them
to sueeach other. Careful investigation,
however, discloses no such intention on
the part of the law-making power. * * *
I am not unmindful of the contention
frequently heard, that the innovations
which our modern civilization has made
upon the conservatism of remoter gen-
erations, respecting the marital relations,
are so radical in their character as to
render it improper, if not impossible, to
stop short of complete revolution; and
such does, indeed, appear to be the
tendency of recent legislation. I think,
however, that I can perceive, upon the
part of the court of last resort, a dispo-
sition to throw the responsibility for the
"new order of things, solely upon the law-
making power, and, at the same time,
to place a check upon this tendency, by
adopting and adhering to rigid rules of
construction :" ADAms, J., Alward v.
Alward, sup ra.
[North Carolina Code of Civil Proce-
dure (chap. 1o, Code of 1883, p. 67),
provides-" SEc. 178. When a married
woman is a party, her husband must be
joined with her, except that (i), when
the action concerns her separate prop-
erty, she may sue alone; (2) when the
action is between herself and her hus-
band, she may sue, or be sued alone;
and in no case need she prosecute, or
defend, by a guardian, or next friend."
[And (p. 55) by-" Sc. 148. If a
person entitled to commence any action
for the recovery of real property, or to
make an entry or defence, founded on
the title to real property, or to rents and
services out of the same, be, at the time
such title shall descend or accrue, either
(i), within the age of twenty-one years,
or (2) insane, or (3) imprisoned on a
criminal charge, or in execution upon
conviction of a criminal offence, cr (4)
a married woman; then such person
may, notwithstanding the time of limi-
tation prescribed in this title be expired,
commence his action, or make his entry,
within three years next after full age,
cowing of sound mind, enlargement out
of prison or discoverture; and at no
time thereafter."
[And (Id.) by-" SFC. i49. When
two or more disabilities shall co-exist,
or when one disability shall supervene
an existing one, the period prescribed,
within which an action may be brought,
shall not begin to run until the termina-
tion of the latest disability."
[And (p. 62) by-" Sac. 163. If a
person entitled to bring an action men-
tioned in the last chapter [i.e., personal
action], except for a penalty, or forfeit-
ure, or against a sheriff, or other officer,
for an escape, be, at the time the cause
of action accrued, either (i), within the
age of twenty-one years; or (2) insane;
or (3) imprisoned on a criminal charge,
or in execution under the sentence of a
criminal court, for a term less than his
natural life; or (4) a married woman;
then such person amay bring his action
within the times before limited, after
the disability shall be removed."
[In Lip ard v. Trouidan (1875), 72
N. C. 551, and Briggs v. Smith (188o),
83 Id. 306, coverture was recognized as
still affording protection, and the power
of suing as a privilege, of which a failure
to exercise was not to operate to the
prejudice of the married woman. Her
rights would be saved I y the sections
cited above.
[Upon the right of the wife to sue
her husband, the case of Manning v.
Manning (x878), 79 N. C. 293, is in-
teresting. It was a demurrer to an
ejectment by the wife, brought for the
recovery from her husband, of real
estate which she had been seized of in
fee at the time of her marriage in
a873. The Constitution of the State,
adopted in I868, declares-Art. xo.
"SEc. 6. The real and personal prop-
SMALL V. SMALL
erty of any female in this State, ac-
quired before marriage, and all prop.
erty, real and personal, to which she
may, after marriage, become in any
manner entitled, shall be and remain
the sole and separate estate and prop-
erty of such female, and shall not be
liable for any debts, obligations, or en-
gagements of her husband, and may be
devised and bequeathed, and, with the
written assent of her husband, con-
veyed by her as if she were unmarried."
The action was sustained because the
wife was entitled "to be let into the
possession, and to damages against her
husband for appropriating to his own
use, against her consent, the rents and
profits." BYut.%, J., Id. 298. "But the
husband's right of ingress and regress
into her dwelling upon the land, and to
live there with her, was also recognized,
as the law was not designed to indirect-
ly create a legal separation, and "the
possession of the husband is not like
that of a stranger, adverse to the wife,
but in law consists with it:" Id. 299.
[Ohio Revised Statutes (ed. 1889,
vol. I, p. 1257, as amended by Act of
March 20, x884), provide that-" SEc.
4996. A married woma shall sue,
and be sued, as if she were unmarried,
and her husband shall be joined with
her only when the cause of action is in
favor of, or against, both her and her
husband." And (Id. x34i, Id.)-"SEc.
5319. When a married woman sues,
or is sued, like proceedings shall be
had and judgment rendered and en-
forced as if she were unmarried, and
her property and estate shall be liable
for the judgment against her, but she
shall be entitled to the benefits of all
exemptions to heads of families."
[There was no necessity of a suit
imposed upon the wife, until the Amen-
datory Act of April 14, 1886 (Laws, p.
74), struck out the words "a married
woman," -from H 4978 and 4986
(which were the saving clauses of the
Statute of Limitations); perhaps, her
husband might command her not to
sue: " She ought to have the right to
sue after his influence, power, and com-
mand are no longer felt:" ATHER-
TON, J. Ashley v. Rockwell (1885),
43 Ohio State 386, 388. Hence, the
Court sustained an action for slander,
though the period of limitation had ex-
pired. The wife was still co.ert.
[Oregon Code of Civil Procedure (as
amended by Act of October 21, 1876,
Laws, p. 73), provides-" SEcr. 30.
When a married woman is a party, her
husband shall be joined with her, ex-
cept that,--. When the action affects
her separate property, or when the cause
of action is for a wrong committed
against her person or character, or is
for wages due for her personal services,
she may sue, or be sued, alone. 2.
When the action is between herself and
her husband, she may sue, or be sued,
alone, and, in no case, need she prose-
cute or defend by a guardian or next
friend."
[By an Act of October 21, 1880
(Laws, p. 7), "to establish and protect
the rights of married women. SEcT. 1.
All laws, which impose, or recognize,
civil disabilities upon a wife, which are
not imposed, or recognized as existing
as to the husband, are hereby repealed:
Provided, that this Act shall not confer
the right to vote, or hold office, upon
the wife, except as is otherwise provided
by law; and for any unjust usurpation
of her property, or natural rights, she
shall have the same right to appeal, in
her own name alone, to the courts of
law or equity, for redress that her hus-
band has." This statute received a
literal interpretation in Baerrellv. Tilton
(1886), 119 U. S. 637, where a joint
action against husband and wife, in joint
possession of land, was sustained.
[The present Statute of Pennsylvania
has already been quoted on page 748,
supra.
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[In -Reilleyv. Reilley (1872),41Brews.
(Pa.) 169, -nd Rohrman v. Rohrman
(1878). 12 Phila. 390 an attachment
was sustained on the part of the wife
against the husband's property, when
deserted by him. although he was not a
seafaring man and she had not been
declared afeme sole trader. The attach-
ment was issued in the name of the wife,
under the second section of the Act of
May 4, 1855 (P. L. 430)-" That when-
soever any husband, from drunkenness,
profligacy, or other cause, shall neglect,
or refuse, to provide for his wife, or
shall desert her, she shall have all
the rights and privileges secured to a
feme sole trader, under the Act of
February 22, M718 * * * 2" The
Act of 17x8 (i Sm. L. 99) provided
"That where any mariners, or others,
are gone, or hereafter shall go, to sea,
leaving their wives at shop-keeping, or
to work for their livelihood at any other
trade in this province, all such wives
shall be deemed, adjudged and taken,
and are hereby declared to be feme sole
traders, and shall have ability, and are
by this Act enabled, to sue and be sued,
plead and be impleaded at law, in any
court or courts of this province, during
their husbands' natural lives, without
naming their husbands in such suits,
pleas or actions; **** "
['This is true in many States, but is
not developed in this annotation, as it
lies outside of the special point treated.
[In Williams's Qpj#eal (1464), 47 Pa.
307, AGNEW, J., said: "Here is a judg-
ment, admitted to be unobjectionable in
point of honesty, given by a husband to
secure his wife's separate estate. We
are asked, in a question of mere distri-
bution [of the proceeds of a sheriff's
sale of the husband's property], to pro-
nounce it void, upon the legal fiction
that they are one in law. The proposi-
tion is shocking to any but the mind of
a black-letter lawyer, and isto be denied,
if it can be resisted upon any proper
legal principle. Unless we must, why
should we go back to a period when
legal logic, like that of the schools, was
so metaphysical that rights were subser-
viert to technicality, and substance to
form? We should rather keep pace, if
we can, with the progress of custom and
legislation. Centuries were consumed
in the slow process of parturition, giving
birth to the benign features of the Act
of 1848. securing the separate estate of
married women." The judgment was
held to be valid.
In re Marvin (1872), xo Phila. 524, it
was ruled that an execution issued by a
wifeon &judgment confessed byherhus-
band directly to her, without the inter-
vention of a trustee, will be set aside at
the instance of another execution credi-
tor. This was in the Common Fleas of
Philadelphia county. The Supreme
Court, however, sustained such an ex-
ecution in Rose et ux. v. Latshaw
(1879), 90 Pa. 238, the principles of
which decision also ruled Lahr's ,1-
eal (x879), Id. 507. TRUNKEY, J.,
said, in deciding the former case-
["We have taken no account of the
forboded ills to follow a decision that a
wife's execution on a judgment against
her husband, is not a nullity. The
Commonwealth is none the worse for
the advanced legislation -for security of
married women, in the ownership and
enjoyment of their property, and will
not be hurt if they are allowed process
for collecting money honestly their due.
An insolvent debtor may exhaust his
means, in payment of a favored credi-
tor, or he may confess judgment to that
creditor, and all his property be seized
in satisfaction thereof. This has long
been the law, and now that the statute
secures the wife her separate estate,
when the husband owes her, he may
rightly give her the preference. If
fraud be alleged, the requisite proof to
establish it, is no stronger, when the
preference is given to a wife, than if to
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a stranger and far greater strictness in
proof is imposed in a wife, to make out
her claim, than upon others": Id. 240.
[In Kincade v. Cunningham (1888),
118 Pa. 5o1, judgment was confessed
by a man to a woman, on a bond, given
in consideration of a contract to marry.
They afterwards married, and a sci. fa.
to revive the judgment was subsequently
issued. Coverture and the want of a
trustee for the plaintiff were not allowed
to be set up as a defense to the judg-
ment on the sdre facias. "The ques-
tion is not now one of the right of the
wife to collect the judgment by execu-
tion against her husband's consent, but
of her right to preserve her security" :
WILLIAMS, J.,Id. 507. This case came
before the Court a second time upon the
question of the wife's right to issue exe-
cution on the judgment and levy on her
husband's property, against his protest,
and it was held that she had such right:
Kbincade v. Cunningham (1888), I
Mona. (Pa.) ii.
[These cases are cited merely upon
the right of the wife to sustain legal
proceedings directly against her hus-
band, at law and without the interven-
tion of a trustee or next friend.
[By Act of March 27,1713 (1 Smith's
Laws, 76), as amended by 27 of Act
of July 30, 1842 (P. L. 456)-" 3.
That if any person, or persons, who is,
or shall be, entitled to any such action
of trespass, detinue, trover, replevin,
actions of account, debt, actions for
trespass, for assault, menace, battery,
wounding, or imprisonment, actions upon
the case for words, be, or at the time of
any cause of such action given or ac-
crued, fallen, or come, shall be within
the age of twenty-one years,fe ne cov-
ert, non coampos mentis [or] imprisoned,
that then such person, or persons, shall
be at liberty to bring the same actions,
so as they take the same within such
times as are hereby before limited, after
their coming to, or being of, full age,
discoverture, of sound memory [or] at
large as other persons."
[By Act of March 26,1785 (2 Smith's
Laws, 300), as amended by i of Act
of March I, i815 (6 Smith's Laws,
277)-" SEC. 4. That- if any person,
or persons, having such right or title,
he or shall be, at the time such right or
title first descended or accrued, within
the age of twenty-one years,fene covert,
ncot comfios menlis, [or] imprisoned,
then such person or persons, and the
heir or heirs of such person or persons,
shall and may, notwithstanding the said
twenty-one years be expired, bring his
or their action, or make his or their
entry, as he, she, or they, might have
done before the passing of this Act, so.
as such person or persons, or the heir
or heirs of such person or persons, shall,
within ten years next after attaining full
age, discoverture, soundness of mind, or
enlargement out of prison, take benefit
of or sue for the same, and no time after
the said thn years. And in case such
pergon or persons shall die within the
said term of ten years, under any of the
disabilities aforesaid, the heir or heirs of
such person or persons, shall have the
same benefit that such person or persons
could or might have had by living until
the disabilities should have ceased, or
been removed. And if any abatement
happen in any proceeding or proceed-
ing; upon such right or title, such pro-
ceeding or proceedings maybe renewed
and continued, within three years from
the time of such abatement, but not
afterwards."
[By Act of April 22, 1856 (P. L. 532)
-" SEC. i. No exception in any Act
of Assembly respecting the limitation of
actions in favor of persons non comfiotes
mentis, imprisoned, femes covert, or
minors, shall extend so as to permit any
person to maintain any action for the
recovery of any lands or tenements, after
thirty years shall have elapsed since the
right of entry thereto accrued, to any
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person within the exceptions aforesaid:
Prrvided, That all persons who now
have rights unbarred, and who would
be sooner barred by this section, shall
not be thereby barred for five years from
the date hereof."
In .lutz's A&1eal(1861),4o Pa. 9o, a
married woman, in 1845, lent to a part-
nership, of which her husband was a
member, money from her separate estate,
for which she received a note payable
in one year with interest. In I857, the
firm made an assignment. Before the
auditor, the claim was presented but the
creditors objected, alleging that it was
barred by the Statute of Limitations.
The claim was allowed, but the excep-
tions filed were sustained and the case
was taken to the Supreme Court, which
reversed the decree of the lower court.
STRONG, J.: ." In Towers v. Hagner
(1837), 3 Whart. Pa. 48, itwasruled that
when a wife lends the income of her sepa-
rate estate to her husband,the Statute of
Limitations does not begin to run
against her claim until the death of her
husband. The reasod given was, that
until then she cannot sue. The debt
exists, but the remedy is suspended.
* * * * The wife was permitted to re-
ceive her property and to lend it, the
husband himself becoming the borrower-
It is not for him, therefore to object that
the money was not hers, nor for the
creditors claiming through him." A
similar ruling was in AMarseller v.
Marsteller (188o), 93 Pa. 350, where
suit was brought by the administrators
of a married woman against her hus-
band for inoney loaned.
The ActofAprilix, 856 (P.L 315),
provides-" 3. Whensoever any hus-
band shall have deserted or separated
himself from his wife, or neglected or re-
fused to support her, or she shall have
been divorced from his bed and board,
it shall be lawful for her to protect her
reputation, by an action for slander or
libel; and she shall also have the right,
by action, to recover her separate earn,
ings or property: Provided, That if hei-f
husband be the defendant, the action
shall be in the name of a next friend."
In Miller v. Z'Iier (1863), 14 Pa. 170,
an action of covenant was brought by a
mared woman, by her next friend,
against her husband, for permitting
-waste on property conveyed to him for
life by an ante-nuptial contract. The
question arose as to the power of the
court to sustain the suit. The lower
court, in a learned opinion which was
affirmed by the Supreme Court, said:-
"It is a well settled principle of the
common law that no suit will lie be-
tween husband and wife. To every
action there .must be par:ies and they
are both treated as one, a man might as
well be permitted to sue himself. It is
otherwise in equity. A husband may
sustain a bill against his wife in a Court
of Chancery, or a wife against her hus-
band. This difference in the power of
the courts to sustain such proceedings,
arises from two causes. The Courts of
Chancery adopted the principles of the
civil law for their guidance, in their
early organization, and under that law,
husband and wife could contract with
each other as if sole, could sue each
other to obtain their rights or enforce
their contracts, and hold their property
in severalty for every purpose. And
the practice in equity has always been
to look to the substance of the right,
and bring in all parties, without regard
to form. In Pennsylvania, our courts
have adopted the common law forms of
action, although affecting to give relief
on equitable principles. It has never
been pretended that a husband could
sue his wife, or a wife her husband in this
State, unless authorityto do so by an Act
of Assembly. The only question is, can
they sue each other byvirtue of any stat-
ute ?. Can the suit be sustained under
the third section of the Act of April ii,
i856?. *. , . Three cases are provided
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for-she may sue to protect her reputa-
tion, and to recover her separate earnings
,or property. *** As we conceive, the
statute was intended to enable her to
sue for the recovery of her earnings,
and also for her effects, if carried off,
either by her husband or others. She
might have such a property in a bond
or promissory note as would enale her
to maintain an action, but unliquidated
damages are not property, either in
common parlance or technical language.
If the act had intended to give the wife
a general power to sue, as a fate sole,
it would have said so. * * Expressio
unius exdlusio est aterius, is a sound
legal maxim. This may, to a certain
extent, be treated as a remedial statute,
and therefore entitled to a liberal con-
struction, but as it countervails a great
common law principle, which makes
the husband and wife one, and over-
turns a salutary rule of public policy,
which prohibits and discourages all liti-
gation between husband and wife, it
should be strictly construed, and not
extended beyond the letter. * * * I
am therefore of the opinion that this
suit for the recovery of damages on ac-
count of a covenant broken, is not
authorized by the Act of Assembly."
[The Public Statutes of Rhode Island,
(chap. I66, ed. 1882, pp. 424, 423),
provide--" SECT. i6. In all actions re-
lating to the property of any married
woman, secured to her by this chapter,
the husband and wife shall jointly sue
and be sued, except in case a trustee of
the same be appointed as hereinafter
provided, and except in actions upon
such contracts as she is authorized to
make by section six of this chapter, in
which last case the wife may sue and be
sued alone." Section 6 is as follows :
"Any married woman may sell and
convey any of her personal estate other
than that described in the preceding
section, in the same manner as if she
were single and unmarried, and may
make contracts respecting the sale and
conveyance thereof, with the same effect
and with the same rights, remedies and
liabilities, as if such con:racts had been
made before marriage, but nothing in
this section shall be so construed as to
authorize any married woman to trans-
act business as a trader."
[The Code of Civil Procedure of South
Carolina (ed. I888, p. 93), requires-
"SEcr. 135. When a married woman
is a party, her husband must be joined
with her, except that-i. When the
action concerns her separate property,
she may sue, or be gued, alone; Pro-
Vid,'d That neither her husband, nor
his property, shall be liable for any re-
covery against her in any such suit, but-
judgment may be enforced by execution
against her sole and separate estate, i.
the same manner as if she were sole.
2. When the act.on is between herself
and her husband, she may sue, or be
sued, alone; and in no case need she
prosecute, or defend, by a guardian or
next friend."
[Under this provision, a wife may file
a complaint against her husband fi r
support and maintenance, as a ditinct
cause of relief: C'kristooAper v. C'hristo-
ther (1882), 18 S. C. 6oo.
[A inarried woman is not included
amongst those under disaliities, who
are excepted out of the periods of l:mi-
tation: Code of Civil Procedure (ed.
i888, pp. SI, 87), H io8, 122.
[In Texas, "under our system of
marital law, as regdlated by the consti-
tution and statutes, and as expoundc:
from time totime by this Court, the wife
can, in a proper case, for the protection
of her separate rights, maintain a suit
in her own name, against 'her husband.
* * We also believe that she would
be entitled, in a proper case, to the
benefit of writs of attachment, sequestra-
tion, injunction, or any like writ, to
which any other creditor would be en-
titled, in order to protect and preserve
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his rights. Of course, writs of this char-
acter, between husband and wife, ought
not to be encouraged, and ought, in
every instance, to be scrutinized very
closely indeed, by the courts, and every
effort made to prevent fraud and collu-
sion between them, to the prejudice
of the rights of creditors, or third par-
ties :" WEsT, A. J., Ryan v. Ryan
(1884), 61 Texas, 474. This was an
action of debt by the wife against her
husband, into which certain creditors of
the husband intervened. The court be-
low erred in giving a binding instruction
that the wife coild not acquire rights
paramount to the creditors of the hus-
band, by issuing an attachment in her
suit, against the community property.
[By the Revised Civil Statutes of
Texas (ed. 1888, Vol. I, p. 412)-"ART.
1204. The husband may sue, either
alone, or jointly with his wife, for the
recovery of any separate property of the
wife, and in case he fail or neglect so
to do, she may, by the authority of the
court, sue for such property in her own
name."
In Nicherson v. Matson (x886), 65
Tex. 281, it was decided that where a
suit was brought by a married woman
against her husband and another, for
false imprisonment, it could not be sus-
tained as to the husband. The Court, in
a lengthy opinion, maintained and ap-
proved the doctrine in Longendyke v.
Longendyke (x863),44 Barb.(N.Y.) 366.
[By Revised Civil Stat. (ed. 1888, pp.
114, 120)-"ART. 3201. If a person
entitled to commence suit for the recov-
ery of real property, or to make any de-
fense founded on the title thereto, be, at
the time such title shall first descend, or
the adverse possession commence-I.
Under the age of twenty-one years; or,
2. Amarried woman; or, 3. Of unsound
mind; or, 4. A person imprisoned; the
time during which such disability shall
continue shall not be deemed any por-
tion of the time limited for the com-
mencement of such suit, or the making.
of such defense; and such person shall
have the same time, after the removal,
of his disability, that is allowed to others
by the provisions of this chapter." And.
".RT. 3222. If a person entitled to
bring any action other than those men-
tioned in chapter one of this title [i.e.,
actions for land], be, at the time the
cause of action accrues, either-i. Under
the age of twenty-one years; 2. A mar-
ried woman; 3. Of unsound mind; 4,
A person imprisoned; the time of such
disability shall not be deemed a portion
of the time limited for the commence-
ment of the action, and such person
shall have the same time, after the re-
moval of his disability, that is allowed
to others by the provisions of this title."
[The disability of a married woman,
under this limitation law, is not such as
to save a right of actioninvolving the
homestead, or community property; in
such a case, she could maintain an ac-
tion during coverture. "The Legisla-
ture nAfat well have provided, that,
when thE husband attempts the aliena-
tion of the homestead, without the con-
sent of the wife, the statute should not
run against her as long as she lives.
But, in our opinion, they have not done
this :" GAINEs, A. J., Hussey v. Moser
(x888), 70 Texas 42,46. However, the
right of a wife to protect community
property which is exempt from execu-
tion, is within the statute, and her dis-
ability will extend the time for com-
mencing an action: Alsup et at. v.
Jordan (1887), 69 Texas 300, 304.
[Utah (Compiled Laws, 1876, Tit.
XVI., Ch. I, p. 342) enacts that-" Sc.
2. Either spouse may sue or be sued,
plead and be impleaded, or defend and
be defended at law."
[And (under Tit. XI, Ch. I, p. 5o6)
-"SEC. 379. A husband shall not be a
witness for, or against, his wife, nor a
wife a witness for, or against, her hus-
band; nor can either, during the mar-
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riage or afterwards, be, without the
consent of the other, examined as to any
communication made by one to the
other during the marriage. But this
exception shall not apply to an action
or proceeding by one against the other."
[Howe et al. v. Blandc n et al. (1849),
21 Vt. 315, decided that the proceed-
ings to compel partition of real estate
between tenants in common, under the
statute of this State, was an adversary
proceeding, and could only be sustained
between those, who could be suitors,
in respect to each other, in the common
law courts. A husband and wife who
were tenants in common of real estate,
could not constitute adverse parties in
such a proceeding; and if the-county
court sustained a petition where the
only parties were husband and wife, and
the object was to procure a division of
land held by them in common, the
judgment ordering the partition, must
be treated as a nullity and the whole
proceeding held coram nonjudice.
[The Revised Statutes of Vermont
(ed. 18go, Tit. 16, chap. 122), as
amended by Act of November 26, 1884
(Laws, p. i2o), provide-" SEC. 2321.
A married woman may make contracts
with any person other than her hus-
band, and bind herself and her separate
property, in the same manner as if she
were unmarried, and may sue and be
sued as to all such contracts made by
her, either before or during coverture,
without her husband being joined in the
action as plaintiff or defendant, and ex-
ecution may issue against her, and be
levied on her sole and separate goods,
chattels, and estate. But this section
shall be subject to the limitation, that
nothing herein contained shall author-
ize a married woman to convey, or
mortgage, her real estate, except by
deed duly executed by her and her hus-
band, as now provided by law; and to
the further limitation that nothing here-
in contained shall authorize a married
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woman to become surety for her hus-
band's debts, except by way of mort-
gage duly executed, as now provided
by law."
[Ellsworth v. Hokitrr, decided by
the Supreme Court of Vermont, August
11, x886, was a case in which the Court
ruled that a promissory note executed
by a husband to his wife was void, and
no action could be maintained thereon,
not even by a third party, endorsee;
POWERS, J., saying: "As between Hop-
kins and his wife, the note was null and
void. They were, at law, incapable of
contracting with each other, and con-
tracts assumed to be made between
them, were not merely voidable, but
absolutely without obligation or force.
* * * There is nothing to show that
this note was the separate statutory or
equitable estate of Mrs. Hopkins. Had
such facts appeared, the note might
have represented an enforceable equit-
able obligation which equity would I ro-
tect." So, also, Sweat v. Haal (1836),
8 Vt. 187, to the same effect.
[Virginia, under Code of x887 (Tit.
28, Ch. xo3, p. 567), provides-" SEc.
2284. All real and personal estate, to
which any woman hereafter marrying,
is entitled at the time of her marriage,
or which any married woman may here-
after acquire or become entitled to, dur-
ing coverture, by gift, grant, purchase,
descent, devise, bequest, or in any
other manner whatever, and the rents,
issues, income, profits, and all increase
thereof, shall be and continue her sep-
arate estate. The separate estate shall
include rights of action, damages for a
wrong, and compensation for property
taken for public use, to which a woman
is entited at her marriage, or to which
she becomes entitled during coverture.
Nothing however in this, or any other
section of this chapter, shall be con-
strued as giving to a married woman a
right to damages, or a right of action
therefor against her husband for any in-
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jury to her person or reputation com-
mitted by him before their marriage or
during the coverture."
[And (p. 698)-" SEC. 2917. If, at
the time at which the right of any per-
son to make entry on, or bring an ac-
tion to recover any land, shall have
first accrued, such person shall be an
infant, married woman, or insane, then
such person, or the person claiming
through him, may, notwithstanding the
said period mentioned in section twenty-
nine hundred and fifteen shall have ex-
.pired, make an entry on, or bring an
action to recover such land, within ten
years next after the time at which the
person to whom such right shall have
first accrued as aforesaid, shall have
ceased to be under such disability as
existed when the same so accrued, or
shall have died, whichever shall first
-have happened. This section shall not
.apply to a married woman having the
tight to make an entry on, or bring an
action to recover land, which is her
separate estate."
[And (p. 702)-" SEC. 2931. If any
person, to whom the right accrues to
bring any such personal action, or sdre
.facas, or any such bill to repeal a
grant, shall be, at the time the same
accrues, an infant, married won)an, or
insane, the same may be brought within
the like number of years after his be-
coming of full age, unmarried, or sane,
that is allowed to a person having no
such impediment to bring the same after
-the right accrues, or after such acknowl-
-edgement as aforesaid, except that it
shall, in no case, be brought after
twenty years from the time when the
right accrued. This section shall not
apply to a married woman to whom the
right accrues to bring any such action,
or sdrefacias, or such bill to repeal a
grant, relating to or affecting her sep-
arate estate."
[Washington, (Code of x88i, Ch.
183, p. 413), provides-' SEc. 2396.
Every married person shall hereafter
have the same right and liberty to ac-
quire, hold, enjoy, and dispose of every
species of property, and to sue and be
sued, as if he or she were unmarried."
[And (p. 413)- SEC. 2398. All
laws which impose or recognize civil
disabilities upon a wife, which are not
imposed or recognized as existing as to
the husband, are hereby abolished, and
for any unjust unsurpation of her nat-
ural or property rights, she shall have
the same right to appeal, in her own
name, to the courts of law or equity,
for redress and protection, that the hus-
band has: Provided always, that noth-
ing in this chapter shall be construed
to confer upon the wife any right to
vote or hold office, except as otherwise
provided by law."
[And (p. 414)-"SEc. 240. Should
either husband, or wife, obtain posses-
sion, or control, of property belonging
to the other, either before, or after,
marriage, the owner of the property
may maintain an action therefor, or for
any right growing out of the same, in
the same manner, and to the same ex-
tent, as if they were unmarried."
[By the same Code of Civil pro-
cedure (Code of 1881, Ch. 1, p. 35)-
"SEC. 6. When a married woman is a
party, her husband must be joined with
her, except: i. When the action con-
cerns her separate property, or her
right or claim to the homestead prop-
erty, she may sue alone. 2. When the
action is between herself and her hus-
band she may sue or be sued alone. 3.
When she is living separate and apart
from her husband, she may sue or be
sued alone."
[West Virginia provides by Code of
x887 (Ch. 66, p. 6 o6 )-" 12. A married
woman may sue and be sued without.
joining her husband in the following
cases: x. Where the action concerns
her separate property. 2. When the
action is between herself and her bus.
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band. 3. When she is living separate
and apart from her husband. And in
no case need she prosecute or defend
by guardian or next friend."
[And, by (Ch. 104, p. 710)-" 3. If,
at the time at which the right of any
person to make an entry on, or bring an
action to recover, any land, shall have
first accrued, such person was an in-
fant, married woman, or insane, then
such person, or the person claiming
through him, may, notwithstanding the
said period of ten years shall have ex-
pired (except in the case of a married
woman, where such land is her sole
and separate property), make an entry
on, or bring an action to recover, such
land, within five years next after the
time at which the 'person to whom
such right shall have first accrued as
aforesaid, shall have ceased to be under
such disability as existed when the same
accrued, or shall have died, whichever
shall first have happened.
(And, by (Chap. 104, p. 713)-" 16.
-If any person, to whom the right ac-
crues to bring any such personal action,
suit, or sdrefadas, or any such bill to
repeal a grant, shall be, at the time the
same accrues, an infant, married woman,
or insane, the same (except in the case
of the married woman, as provided in
section 3 [suPra] of this chapter), may
be brought within the like number of
years after his becoming of full age, un-
married or sane, that is allowed to a
person, having no such impediment to
bring the same after the right accrues,
or after such acknowledgment as afore-
said, except that it shall in no case be
brought after twenty years from the
time when the right accrued."
In Roseberry v. Roseberry (1886), 27
W. Va. 759, an action of debt was
brought by a married woman against
her husband, on notes executed by de-
fendantin favo"ofplaintiff. The action
was dismissed, since the common law
is in full force and vigor in West Vir-
ginia, as to the power of a married
woman to contract with her husband.
And see Crowther v. Crowiher (iS68),
55 Me. 358; Sinith v. Gorman (IS56),
41 Id. 408; Jackson v. Per's (IS52),
zo Cush. (Mass.) 550; Ingham v. While
(1862), 4 Allen (Mass.) 412; Carey &
Co. v. Burruss &' Pftzer (1882), 20
W. Va. 571.
[Wisconsin (Annotated Stat. I889,
Ch. xo8, p. 1358) enacts-" SEc. 2345.
Every married woman may sue in her
own name, and shall have all the rem-
edies of an unmarried woman, in regard
to her separate property or business, and
to recover the earnings secured to her
by the two next preceding sections, and
shall be liable to be sued in respect to
her separate property or business, and
judgment may be rendered against her
and be enforced against her and her
separate property, in all respects as if
she were unmarried. And any married
woman may bring and maintain an. ac-
tion in her own name for any injury to
her person or character, the same as if
she were sole, and any judgment recov-
ered in such action shall be the separate
property and estate of such married
woman, provided that nothing herein
contained shall affect the right of the
husband to maintain a separate action
for any such injuries as now provided
by law."
[By the same Stat. (Tit. 25, Ch. ri8,
p. 1486)--" Sec. 2608. When a married
woman is a party, her husband must be
joined with her, 6xcept that when the
action concerns her separate property or
business, or alleged antenuptial debts,
or is between herself and her husband,
she may sue and be sued alone."
[In Beard v. Dedo'ph (1871), 29
Wis. i4O, DIXlON, C. J., said: "With
respect to her separate property, the
statute has placed her upon the same
footing as to all the world, her husband
included, as if this were her condition-
as if she were, in the words of the Act,
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'a single female.'" In this ca-c, the
husband transferred to his wife, the note
in suit, before maturity, and the ca.,e
relate., only to tie validity of tin tians-
fer. lut it wa. the foundation fur tie
next ci'ed case.
In ,.i v. G,'isz,'r, ci a'.l kx t85),
62 Wik. 494, tIle quebtion aroe in an
action of replevin, as to the right otf a
man to recover from his wife certain
property held by her.
CASSOn .V, J.: " It is urged the wife
should nut be made a party defendant,
because the husband cannot maintain an
action against his wife. This certainly
would be the law on the old theory of
the marital relation. Whether it is now,
must depend upon statute. It is the
law that every married woman may sue
in her own name, and has all the reme-
dies of an unmarried woman, in regard
to her separate property or business : R.
S., 2345. The statute entirely re-
moves the disabilities of coverture. As
to her separate property, or in contests
over what she claims to be her separate
property, there can be no doubt under
this statute but what she can sue her
husband at law or in equity;" citing
Meoore v. 11oore (S72), 47 N. Y. 467;
Southwick v. Southwick (1872), 49
Id. 510; IVI-i,'htv. IVrig4ht (1873), 54
Id. 437; Be,'del v. Parhh]fursi (1879),
19 Hun (N. Y.) 358; Vood v. Mood
(188), 83 N. Y. 575.
[Wyoming (Rev. Stat. I887, Tit. 28,
Ch. 2, p. 417) provides-"Slte. 156o.
Any woman may, while married, sue
and be sued in all matters having rela-
tion to her property, person, or reputa-
tion, in the same manner as if she were
s,,'." And under the Code of Civil
I'ucedure tId., Tit. 38, Ch. 3, P- 559)
-- ' SPA. 23S5. Hereafter, in any civil
ac ion, uit ,or proceeding, whenever any
married woman is a party, it shall not
be nececs.ary to j,i: her husband with
her as a patty, except in such case.;
witere it would be necessary to join
-uch husi,and without reference to the
fact of his marriage tn,, uch wotian."
l'here are rea.ons for construing
statutes as against authorizing actions
for tort between husband and wife,
which do not exi.t in respect to actions
relating to contracts. lBefore the statutes,
the damages arising from injuries to the
pers,)n or character of the wife, were to
be sued for by the husband and wife,
and when recovered, belonged to the
husband, and these statutes were evi-
dently intended to change the law only
to allow tite wife to sue for and recover
for herself in all matters pertaining to
her separate propeity. Were actions
for tort to Le sustained by the wife
again.t her htsband under statute law,
there would be a lack of mutuality of
remedy.
[Note should be made that this an-
notation relates solely to the power of
a wife to sue her husband, alone and
without any trustee or other third per-
sun, at law atl not in equity, and under
ordinary circun.tances and not in cases
of desertion or other special statutory
power. The subject is so extensive
and yet so important as to demand this
minute treatment. The other causes of
suit will be treated in the future.-ED.
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